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Abstract
This dissertation is composed of three chapters, the first demonstrates that natural
gas violates many of the simplifying assumptions frequently used in modeling its
behavior. Careful analysis of futures contracts written on gas suggests that gas prices
are seasonal while returns are non-Gaussian and evidence stochastic volatility. In
addition, examination of options prices indicates the intermittent presence of jumps.
We find that models which disregard these properties struggle to recover options
prices with any precision. Thus, we propose an alternative nonparametric approach
to gas options pricing that captures these salient features while also shedding light
on the nature of risk aversion embedded in gas markets.
The second chapter presents new estimates and approaches to estimating the
home bias puzzle. It uses micro-level data to calculate households' foreign equity
exposure as a function of wealth. We find simple estimates have significant errors-in-
variables problems and we construct an estimator using grouping to account for this
issue. Our estimates still imply low aggregate investment in foreign equity. Finally,
we disaggregate the investment decision by incorporating two step decisions that
allow households to forgo participating in the market. As a result of the decoupling,
we find foreign equity levels closer to that of standard portfolio theories.
The final chapter considers principal-agent models in which the principal cannot
measure the output nor the effort level of agents. To model this situation, we use utility
models that include identity, justified partly by empirical results from peer-effects, and
apply these extended utility functions. In the single agent case, introducing identity
amounts to modifying the utility function and does not lead to dramatic results. In
the multiple agent case, we find that the addition of identity can lead to more efficient
outcomes than cases where identity is ignored. The addition of identity, however, can
also lead to counter-intuitive results due to the interactions among agents and may
produce second-best outcomes that are worse than the case without identity. Finally
the addition of identity can help explain some empirical results that may be difficult
to explain with standard models.
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Chapter 1
Capturing the Idiosyncrasies of
Natural Gas Markets for Better
Derivative Pricing
With Erik C. Ruben
Abstract
In this paper, we demonstrate that natural gas violates many of the simplifying
assumptions frequently used in modeling its behavior. Careful analysis of futures
contracts written on gas suggests that gas prices are seasonal while returns are non-
Gaussian, and evidence stochastic volatility. In addition, examination of options prices
indicates the intermittent presence of jumps. We find that models which disregard
these properties can accurately predict futures prices, but struggle to recover options
prices with any precision. Thus, we propose an alternative nonparametric approach
to gas options pricing that captures these salient features while also shedding light
on the nature of risk aversion embedded in gas markets important for evaluating and
calibrating derivatives models.
1.1 Introduction
Over the last thirty years, natural gas markets have come to play an extremely
important role in the global economy. In 2005, the United States alone consumed
about $260 billion in natural gas.' In that same year, greater than $1 trillion in gas
1This assumes $10 average gas and 26 trillion cubic feet of consumption. (cf. Energy Information
Administration (2004))
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futures traded on the New York Mercantile Exchange (NYMEX).2 A variety of factors
including its relative abundance, low cost of transport, and promise as a clean source
of fuel, have helped to make natural gas the world's fastest growing commodity as
well a major profit driver for leading investment banks.3 Natural gas is unlikely
to lose any of its momentum as interest in national energy independence, reduced
environmental impact, and the low cost associated with gas-fired power generation
drive producers and consumers towards its further embrace. In addition to growth in
the underlying physical market, gas's high price volatility will increasingly motivate
market participants to manage their risk by trading in derivatives.
Despite its substantial economic significance, natural gas has received compara-
tively little attention from researchers in finance. The vast literature in asset pricing
has certainly provided some insights into the value of spot prices and derivative
contracts written on gas. However, academic work has mostly focused on equities,
fixed income securities, and currencies. Commodities, and natural gas in particular,
behave quite differently empirically than other asset classes making it difficult to
apply, for example, equity derivative models to price natural gas options. Gas prices
are clearly seasonal and evidence volatility and jumps which vary through time in a
complicated manner. Price levels seem to be related to convenience yields, storage
costs, and the price of alternative energy sources such as oil.4 As documented in
this paper, natural gas derivatives have unique properties too; futures on gas are
distinguished by a small degree of backwardation, a feature prominent among agri-
cultural and metal commodities, while options on futures display upwards sloping
implied volatility wings. Finally, natural gas markets evidence an unusually low
degree of geographic integration. As a result, in the United States, where pipeline
networks in eastern and western states do not interconnect to a great degree, there is
substantial price segmentation across regions.5 All of these factors suggest that gas's
underlying market microstructure and representative stochastic process differ from
those of equities and fixed income securities and other commodities as well. These
differences have profound implications not only for the understanding of gas prices in
their own right, but for the valuation and hedging of both real assets and financial
derivative contracts tied to the underlying price of gas.
A collection of recent work, including Pindyck (2001), Pindyck (2004), Gibson and
Schwartz (1989), Schwartz (1997), Miltersen and Schwartz (1998), Schwartz and
Smith (2000), Todorova (2004b), and Clewlow and Strickland (2000), attempts to
capture a few of the stylized facts regarding commodities futures and incorporate
them into parametric partial and general equilibrium models. To the extent that the
2The value of over-the-counter transactions in futures and other derivative contracts totaled an
even greater amount according to industry sources.
3 See Geman (2005, p. 227).
4 Convenience yield refers to the benefit associated with directly holding inventory in an underlying
asset rather than a derivative contract written on the product. See Pindyck (2004).
5 See Cuddington and Wang (April 20, 2005).
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authors extend their models directly to natural gas, they limit their empirical analysis
to futures prices. This is likely due to the fact that exchange-traded gas derivatives
were limited before March of 2004 when NYMEX introduced a European options
contract on gas futures.6 In addition to all the other benefits they offer with respect to
risk management and market completion, options markets provide rich information
about the underlying security's market structure.7 A spate of recent papers including
Jackwerth (2000), Ait-Sahalia and Lo (2000), Carr and Wu (2003b), Carr and Wu
(2003a), and Carr and Wu (2004) have exploited the theoretical links between option
prices and those of the underlying to deduce important characteristics about investor
preferences and admissible stochastic processes.
To date, researchers have made numerous simplifying assumptions in their at-
tempts to model commodities markets. We show that natural gas meaningfully
violates many of the idealized conditions commonly imposed. Moreover, these de-
partures, which can be grouped into two classes, are of first order importance when
pricing derivatives written on gas. First, there are features such as non-normality,
seasonality, and stochastic volatility in returns which are evident from direct analysis
of gas spot and futures prices. The second class of deviations are those features, such
as low risk aversion and the intermittent presence of jumps, which are only observable
via indirect examination using options data. This paper sets out to accomplish the
following: (1) leverage specialized empirical tools from the equity options literature
along with more standard econometric techniques to document the important features
of gas markets often neglected in extant models, (2) demonstrate how the failure to
incorporate these features can lead to substantially magnified pricing errors in options
markets relative to futures markets, and (3) propose an alternative nonparametric
approach to derivative pricing that avoids these pitfalls.
The paper proceeds as follows: In Section 1.2, we furnish an abbreviated survey
of the literature to give context to our findings. Section 1.3 is devoted to explaining
our data set. Section 1.4 documents important features of natural gas's stochastic
process. First, the section offers evidence from spot and futures prices of the idiosyn-
cratic nature of gas's process. Next, it exploits estimation techniques first employed
by Carr and Wu to identify the periodic presence of jumps in addition to diffusive
behavior. Section 1.5 makes use of an observation by Breeden and Litzenberger (1978)
regarding the link between European options prices and state price densities as well
as an estimation technique employed by Alt-Sahalia and Lo (2000) and Jackwerth
(2000) to provide evidence of another important feature of gas markets: investor risk
aversion that is low and relatively constant in wealth. Section 1.6 introduces several
approaches to pricing natural gas options representative of the those in the existing
literature. It establishes the failure of these candidate models to accurately recover
the market prices of options as the result of the misspecifications in the stochastic pro-
cess and the nature of risk aversion highlighted in the prior two sections of the paper.
6NYMEX introduced American options on natural gas futures in 1992.
7See Ross (1976).
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Section 1.7 offers an alternative nonparametric means of pricing derivatives using a
kernel estimator which disregards the common restrictions we have determined to
be inaccurate. Consequently, the kernel estimator is significantly more successful in
pricing options than the other methods considered. Section 1.8 concludes.
1.2 Background and Literature Review
Some of the earliest research into commodity pricing dates back to work by Kaldor,
Working, and Telser who studied the interplay of storage costs and convenience
yields and their impact on the relationship between spot and futures prices.8 Recent
efforts have focused on establishing either richer microfoundations or better empirical
properties at the cost of reduced form modeling. Among the structural approaches,
some of the more notable papers include Sundaresan (1984), Chambers and Bailey
(1996), and Routledge, Seppi, and Spatt (2000). Sundaresan (1984) develops an
equilibrium model for spot and futures prices in a nonrenewable commodity market
characterized by uncertain exogenous discoveries of the resource. The paper finds
that in periods between supply shocks, spot prices generate positive excess return as a
function of the price elasticity of demand, the mean arrival rate of discoveries, and the
degree of enlargement to existing reserves. In times of repeated discoveries, the model
predicts discontinuous price declines. Using equilibrium arguments, Sundaresan
derives the price of a futures contract as a function of the price elasticity of demand,
the spot price, the volatility in reserve levels, and the contract's time to maturity.
Chambers and Bailey (1996) focuses on the determination of spot prices by exam-
ining equilibria under various assumptions about the nature of supply shocks. The
paper proves the existence of a unique stationary rational expectations equilibrium
under three types of disturbances: independent and identically distributed, time
dependent, and periodic. It develops testable implications for each model type and
conducts an empirical exercise with a variety of agricultural commodities; the paper
finds weak support for a model with periodic supply shocks.
Routledge, Seppi, and Spatt (2000) builds on work by Wright and Williams (1989),
Chambers and Bailey (1996), and Deaton and Laroque (1996) to develop a competitive
rational expectations model of storage. The paper solves for the equilibrium level of
inventory in a setting with competitive risk-neutral agents in which "immediate use"
consumption value is determined by a mean-reverting Markov process. The inventory
rule and shock process together determine the spot and forward price processes. In
empirically testing their model with NYMEX crude oil futures, Routledge et al. find
that the one-factor version fails to produce the correct conditional and unconditional
moments of the data while the two-factor extension has somewhat greater success.
Amongst those papers that start from a set of reduced form assumptions and make
use of no-arbitrage arguments, Black (1976) is perhaps the best known. It forgoes
8 See Kaldor (1939), Working (1948), Working (1949), and Telser (1958).
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analysis of spot prices and focuses instead on deriving a closed form expression for
the value of commodity options written on futures prices. The method amounts to
first, valuing a futures contract as the expected value under the risk-neutral measure
of the spot at the time of expiration, and second, replacing the value of the spot in
the original Black-Scholes-Merton formula with the discounted value of the futures
price. The paper makes the simplifying assumption that futures have a lognormal
distribution.
In a series of primarily co-written papers, Eduardo Schwartz has developed several
approaches to modeling spot commodity prices as well as futures and options on
futures. The first paper in the sequence, Gibson and Schwartz (1989), adapts the
two factor partial equilibrium bond pricing model of Brennan and Schwartz (1979)
to commodity markets. In this context, the two factors are the spot price of the
commodity and the instantaneous convenience yield, which are assumed to evolve
according to a geometric Brownian motion and mean reverting diffusion process
respectively. As an empirical exercise, the paper looks at weekly oil futures and finds
that the model prices short-term futures with reasonable success. Schwartz (1997)
extends Gibson and Schwartz (1989) by adding an instantaneous interest rate that
also follows a mean-reverting process. More importantly, this iteration in the series
shows how to take advantage of the model's inherent Markovness by rewriting it in
state space form and estimating the unobserved state variables via the Kalman filter
and maximum likelihood technique.
Miltersen and Schwartz (1998) further builds on Schwartz (1997) by deriving
an analytical expression for valuing European options on commodity futures in the
presence of stochastic interest rates and stochastic convenience yields. In the same
Journal of Finance issue, Hilliard and Reis (1998) incorporates jumps in the spot
process into the framework of Schwartz (1997). The paper manages to endogenize
the market price of risk stemming from interest rates but leaves the risk associated
with the convenience yield as an exogenous parameter set in equilibrium. Schwartz
and Smith (2000) breaks from the tradition of modeling spot prices as draws from
a lognormal distribution so that it can capture both the effect of price's long-term
impact on supply as well as more immediate deviations from the equilibrium level.
To accomplish this, the paper formalizes a two factor model. The first factor follows
an Ornstein-Uhlenbeck process which reverts back to zero and is designed to soak
up short-term shocks like supply interruptions and demand variation stemming
from weather. The second factor, which evolves according to a geometric Brownian
motion with drift, incorporates long-term changes to the equilibrium price level
resulting from political and regulatory effects, technological improvements related to
the discovery and production of the commodity, and expectations regarding exhaustion
of the existing supply. As with Schwartz (1997), the two-factor formulation admits an
easy state space representation so that Kalman filtering and maximum likelihood can
be used for its estimation. Though formally equivalent to Schwartz (1997), Schwartz
and Smith (2000) has greater econometric and intuitive appeal. Specifically, the
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short-term/long-term model is more "orthogonal" in its dynamics than the approach
based on spot prices and convenience yields. In the Gibson and Schwartz (1989)
framework, the convenience yield plays a role in the stochastic process for the spot
price whereas in the Schwartz and Smith (2000) set-up, the only interaction between
factors arises via the correlation of their stochastic increments. Schwartz and Smith
argue that this orthogonality is not only cleaner (i.e. the volatility for the price of a
futures contracts is equal to the volatility of the sum of short- and long-term factors)
but it may make it possible to safely disregard the short-term factor when valuing
long-term assets. Such a simplification facilitates extensions to the model like that of
a stochastic equilibrium growth rate. Finally, the authors estimate the parameters of
the model using prices from oil futures contracts
Todorova (2004b), whose primary aim is achieving a closer fit to natural gas futures
data, incorporates explicit seasonal price fluctuations into the framework of Schwartz
and Smith (2000). To this end, the paper considers a third "seasonal" stochastic factor
as well as various other means of deseasonalizing the data. Clewlow and Strickland
(2000) take a nonparametric approach based on principal component analysis to
modeling the futures curve; the strategy is flexible enough to take seasonality into
account. Examining the case of gas futures, Todorova compares the results generated
by her models with those implied by Schwartz and Smith (2000) and the volatility
functions model of Clewlow and Strickland (2000). She finds that the three factor
model with the stochastic seasonal component produces the highest likelihood amongst
all the models considered but that Clewlow and Strickland's methodology has superior
out-of-sample prediction performance.
More recently, Doran (2005), building on earlier work in Doran and Ronn (2006),
attempts to model natural gas options under various stochastic volatility regimes.
Although he does not use actual European option prices, he makes use of a technique
pioneered in Barone-Adesi and Whaley (1987) to approximate European prices from
traded American options. He finds best out of sample performance in a least absolute
deviations sense using a variant of the Bates (1996) stochastic volatility and jumps
model where he additionally allows for jumps in the volatility itself.
1.3 Data
In this section, we describe the data used in this paper and highlight some of its
salient features. The two types of gas derivatives examined, natural gas futures
and European options written on futures, are exchange traded on NYMEX. Yield
curves are constructed from data on government securities made available by the US
Treasury Department.
1.3. DATA
1.3.1 Futures Data
Our data on natural gas futures (symbol: NG) consist of daily settlement prices for
the natural gas futures contract traded on NYMEX from April 1990 to December
2005.9 10 Contracts are priced in dollars per million British thermal units (mmBtu)
and obligate the seller to deliver gas to the Henry Hub in Louisiana. The trading
unit for the market is 10, 000 mmBtu. The data consists of 3,942 days of prices for
contracts of 12 different maturities-a one month maturity, two month maturity, and
so on up until and including a twelve month maturity contract.
Estimation of parametric pricing models often necessitates the use of synthetic
fixed maturity data in order to reduce the dimensionality of the problem; otherwise,
contracts would not be comparable through time and hence require the estimation of
parameters which change, for example, daily. Thus, we construct a complete futures
curve for each trading day using actual prices and interpolate via a cubic spline
approximation procedure a constant maturity price series. Throughout the paper, we
make special use of our synthetic contracts with maturities that are multiples of a
month. 12
Liquidity in natural gas, as with other commodities, is concentrated in futures
rather than spot markets. While the dynamics of futures markets, per se, are not
of principal interest in this paper, NYMEX options which play a central role in
our investigation, are written on futures and thus our interaction with them is
unavoidable. Consequently, we provide some analysis of their characteristics as well.
Table 1.1 highlights some basic sample statistics of the shortest maturity contract
which can be interpreted as a proxy for the spot price. One observation immediately
evident from this table is the increasing average price, a point to which we return
in Section 1.6.1 when we detrend the data. In particular, prices rise substantially
after the year 2000. In figure 1.1, we illustrate the dynamics of natural gas futures by
showing the settlement prices for all of the contracts from March 2004 to December
2005 (i.e. the period for which we have options data) for maturities ranging from one
9See http: //www. nymex.com/.
10Settled prices are volume-weighted averages of transactions which occur in the final two minutes
of the trading session.
"As is standard with futures, the one month contract is not the same instrument across days because
the time to expiration changes daily. For example, on January 1st, the contract expiring in February of
the same year matures in 30 days while the one month contract on January 2nd matures in 29 days.
This feature of futures contracts necessitates some care in modeling since the one month contract is
not the same asset through time.
12 There are, of course, alternatives to constructing a constant maturity price series. One procedure
is simply to define the one month contract as the contract expiring the following month. Another is
to define the one month contract based on a window wherein it equals the contract which expires the
following month if the time to expiry is greater than, say 2 weeks, and equal to the contract expiring in
2 months otherwise. This method easily extends to other contracts. We found that neither of these
procedures works well in spot price models and generally produces a poorer fit than that obtained via a
spline.
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Table 1.1: Natural Gas Futures Sample Statistics
The prices in the table are those of the one month contract and are denominated in dollars.
Time Period
Statistic Entire Sample 90-95 95-00 00-05 3/04-12/05
Min 1.046 1.046 1.323 1.830 4.570
1st Quartile 1.895 1.510 1.946 3.491 6.146
Median 2.358 1.720 2.287 5.149 6.819
Mean 3.315 1.794 2.579 5.412 7.819
3rd Quartile 4.294 2.085 2.748 6.348 8.117
Max 15.380 3.448 9.980 15.380 15.380
Std. Dev. 2.275 0.376 1.132 2.473 2.582
month to twelve months. The plot demonstrates that prices rise over the time period.
In addition, the two prominent diagonal "humps" in the plot clearly testify to strong
seasonality as the protrusions in price in the Date-Price plane always correspond
to December and January contracts. These humps are also evidence of consistent
backwardation in gas markets.
There are several more important features of the futures curve and its evolution
through time that deserve mention. First, and not surprisingly, there exists significant
correlation between the prices of different contracts on a given day; correlations often
exceed 0.9. Second, we examine the realized distributions of returns between pairs
of contracts using Kolmogorov-Smirnov tests and find that we cannot statistically
reject the null hypothesis that the returns of contracts with different maturities are
realizations from the same distribution. Finally, we look at the correlation between
continuously compounded daily returns of different contracts and find that returns at
time t and time t + T have correlations near 0 for values of T ranging from 30 days to
360 days.
1.3.2 Options Data
We also make use of data on European-style options on natural gas futures (symbol:
LN) traded on NYMEX.13 The options essentially expire at the same time as the
underlying futures contract and, as is the case with futures, prices are quoted per
mmBTU. One option constitutes the right to buy or sell one futures contract on
10,000 mmBTU of gas. The data consists of daily settlement prices in dollars for
call and put options traded on NYMEX from March 2004 (when the options began
trading) to December 2005. This corresponds to 455 trading days and 47,408 contracts
with a positive trading volume. To allow for simpler pricing models and reduce
13We make use of daily "settled" prices as determined by NYMEX's Options Settlement Committee
at the end of trading.
1.3. DATA
Figure 1.1: Natural Gas Futures Prices
The figure plots the daily futures curve from March 1, 2004 until December 31, 2005 using contracts
with maturities from 1 to 12 months. Prices are in dollars.
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Table 1.2: Option Summary Statistics
Call price is the price of the call in dollars. Also, we have used put-call parity to translate the put
prices into calls and the table reports those prices. Implied volatility represents the implied volatility
as calculated using the pricing formula from Black (1976), T represents the time to maturity in years,
X represents the strike price in dollars, and r represents the risk-free interest rate used for that option
calculated as we have described in Section 1.3.3.
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min Median Max
Call price ($) 1.162 1.010 0.000 0.915 10.710
Implied a (%) 39.890 12.243 0.049 38.280 159.400
S(years) 0.753 0.707 0.011 0.564 5.536
X ($) 8.454 3.111 1.000 7.750 99.000
r (%) 3.103 0.836 0.776 3.195 4.557
dimensionality, we use put-call parity to convert the put option prices into call prices.
When both puts and calls are traded with the same maturity and strike and both have
positive trade volume, we follow a simple decision rule of using the price implied by
the derivative with the higher trade volume. Thus we use the actual call price if its
volume exceeds that of the put and otherwise use the implied call price of the put. We
only include option prices where there is positive trading volume to ensure a higher
confidence in the reported price quotes.
For several pricing models, we also need pricing information on the underlying
futures contract. Thus, we merge the futures data, interest rate data, and option data
to produce a combined data file. This constructed dataset includes 427 trading days
from March 2004 to December 2005 and has 38,885 unique option prices. We report
various summary statistics for the option data in table 1.2 and table 1.3.
For the pricing models that we introduce later in this paper, we describe the options
in terms of the Black (1976) implied volatilities rather than the prices themselves.
Since Black (1976) provides a unique one-to-one mapping between prices and implied
volatilities, this presents no loss of information. Further, it complies with both
industry and academic convention. We are particularly interested in how variables
such as moneyness, which is defined as an option's strike price divided by the price of
the underlying futures contract, and time to expiry, influence implied volatility and
thus prices.
To produce a smooth visualization of the surface implied by the options, we esti-
mate the relationship between time to maturity, moneyness, and implied volatility
using a nonparametric series regression. 14 Several representative plots are provided
in figure 1.2. As is evident from the plot, the relationship between implied volatility,
time to expiry and moneyness is not entirely stable through time yet the overall shape
14For these plots, a third order Taylor approximation is used as the approximation function. The
results are robust to changing this approximation function.
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Table 1.3: Natural Gas Futures and Options Median Volumes by Contract
The Maturity column represents the contract's time to maturity in months. The NG volume column
represents the median number of contracts traded over the entire data set from 1990 to 2005 and the
LN volume represents the median number of options traded using the entire sample.
Maturity NG Volume LN Volume
1 20,700 200
2 9,160 150
3 3,639 150
4 2,033 100
5 1,348 100
6 953 100
7 676 100
8 503 100
9 393 100
10 311 100
11 241 100
12 208 100
is quite persistent.
First, the implied volatility is not constant and each month produces a volatility
surface entirely different than the plane which arises out of the traditional Black-
Scholes-Merton assumptions. Second, over almost any time period, there is a pro-
nounced positive relationship between moneyness and implied volatility. This is the
opposite of the relationship we observe in equity index options, and different than
the "smiles" that characterize equity options. Also, there is a negative relationship
between the time to maturity and implied volatility. Again, this contrasts with what
we often observe in equity option markets. These relationships evidenced in the actual
data are quite strong and explored in later sections to make inferences about the
underlying gas market and evaluate the accuracy with which option models recover
market prices.
1.3.3 Interest Rate Data
Our interest rate data consists of daily rate quotes for fixed maturity securities with
expirations in 1 month, 3 months, 6 months, and several longer term maturities. 15
The US Treasury Department has made this data available since 1990 thus more
15The Treasury Department uses cubic spline interpolation to actually derive these
rates. See http: //www. treasury. gov/of fices/domestic- finance/debt-management/
interest- rate/yieldmethod. html for more information.
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Figure 1.2: Implied Volatility Surface of Actual Prices
Actual Data for August 2004 Actual Data for November 2004
Actual Data for February 2005
Actual Data for November 2005
Actual Data for May 2005
Actual Data for August 2005
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than matching the life of our combined futures and options data sets.16 In estimating
various models throughout the paper, we utilize interpolations from cubic splines of
the complete fixed-length Treasury rate curve to estimate the risk-free rate associated
with a given maturity and trade date. Overall, we find that our models are not
especially sensitive to interest rates.
1.4 Analysis Under the Objective Measure: Process
Specification
In this section, we use both the futures and the options data to illuminate the dynamics
of natural gas. These properties are critical stylized facts that most existing papers,
such as those cited in Section 1.2, largely ignore because their introduction makes
modeling and estimation a more intractable task, because they are poorly documented,
or because they are specific to gas while the author's focus is elsewhere. We view as a
central contribution of this paper the notion that correctly capturing these features is
particularly significant when one is trying to value derivatives written on gas. We first
highlight three features of the gas process that are obtainable from direct analysis of
the futures prices and then proceed to analyze those exposed via an examination of
options written on those futures.
1.4.1 Evidence from Futures
We begin by utilizing futures data to document the empirical properties which charac-
terize the dynamics driving gas markets. One crucial aspect in which gas markets
behave in a similar manner to what we observe in, for example, equity markets
involves the pattern in which the distribution of returns evolves over time. Specifi-
cally, we test the hypothesis that simple and continuously compounded returns are
normally distributed. First, we construct daily, weekly, and monthly returns and
generate Q-Q plots against a normal distribution to check for normality. The Q-Q
plot shows points that represent the realized quantiles of the actual futures returns
and a line that represents the quantiles of a normal distribution with the same mean
and standard deviation. If the futures returns were normal, we would expect the
points to lie on the line. As with equities, it seems clear from figure 1.3 that short
duration returns are non-Gaussian while longer duration returns have a distribution
that is closer to normal. We formally test this hypothesis with Shapiro-Wilk tests. We
report the results from the Shapiro-Wilk test in table 1.4 and note that the tests reject
the hypothesis that returns are normally distributed for short duration returns, but
16The data is available online from Treasury's website: http: / /www. treasury. gov/of f ices/
domestic-finance/debt-management/interest-rate/yield.shtml.
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Table 1.4: Representative Test of Normality
Maturities are in months and W represents the Shapiro-Wilk test statistic. *** represents significance
at the 1 percent level and hence we can reject normality at the 99 percent confidence level.
Daily Weekly Monthly
Maturity W W W
1 0.882*** 0.983*** 0.991
2 0.888*** 0.984*** 0.992
3 0.893*** 0.985*** 0.995
4 0.896*** 0.985*** 0.996
5 0.896*** 0.987*** 0.995
6 0.899*** 0.988*** 0.994
7 0.907*** 0.989*** 0.993
8 0.919*** 0.990*** 0.993
9 0.930*** 0.991*** 0.994
10 0.938*** 0.991*** 0.996
11 0.941*** 0.991*** 0.996
12 0.943*** 0.992*** 0.996
cannot reject normality in monthly returns. 17 These results indicate that the common
assumption of a lognormal price process can prove problematic.
A second important property of gas made evident from analysis of futures prices is
its randomly time-varying volatility. The accurate pricing of options, an important
component of this paper, is closely linked to nature of volatility. More precisely, the
Black-Scholes-Merton framework rests heavily on the assumption that an asset's
quadratic variation over any finite time interval is deterministic. In the standard case
that the underlying asset follows a diffusion process with nonstochastic coefficients,
realized variance is deterministic and equal to the integral over time of the squared
value of the diffusion coefficients. 18 The presence of stochastic volatility, then, rep-
resents a substantial departure from the Black-Scholes-Merton world. We find that
natural gas exhibits stochastic volatility and illustrate this fact by calculating rolling
30-day standard deviations. As is evident in figure 1.4, there are significant changes
in the estimated volatility through time as well as differences between estimates
constructed from contracts of different maturities. Consequently, models which fail to
capture gas's time-varying volatility will almost certainly produce incorrect estimates
of option prices.
A third and highly distinctive yet poorly modeled feature of natural gas is the
17The Kolmogorov-Smirnov test does not work well here because it requires the sample to have no
ties in order to generate an exact distribution. We do not meet this requirement and hence must rely
on a potentially very inaccurate approximation. Hence we do not report that test statistic.
18See Shreve (2004, p. 107) and Rebonato (2004, pp. 97-98) for a more detailed discussion.
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Figure 1.3: Representative Q-Q Plots
The first column includes Q-Q plots comparing the sample quantiles of daily, weekly, and monthly
returns of the 1-month futures contract against the quantiles of the normal distribution whose mean
and variance match the sample mean and variance of the 1 month contracts' returns. The second
column offers the same analysis for the 12 month contract.
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Figure 1.4: Natural Gas Price Volatility
The top panel shows a rolling estimate of the sample standard deviation of the daily price of a 1 month
futures contract. The bottom panel shows the analogue for a 12 month futures contract.
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Table 1.5: Average Monthly Price Deviations
The month column represents the period in which a given contract matures. The deviation represents
the average deviation over the entire sample where individual deviation is defined as the difference
between the price of a contract expiring in a given month on a particular day and the average price for
all contracts on that day as a percent of that average price. We aggregate over days to produce the
average deviation. These deviations are denominated in dollars.
Month Deviation Month Deviation
January 0.136 July -0.055
February 0.074 August -0.050
March 0.006 September -0.049
April -0.056 October -0.029
May -0.063 November 0.037
June -0.060 December 0.108
seasonal fluctuation in prices. Figure 1.1 provides visual evidence for the presence
of seasonality. Here, we provide further proof by examining the extent to which
contracts' prices exceed the average price of all the contracts traded on a given day.
More formally, we compute daily price averages and determine the monthly deviation
(in percentage terms) from that average. Aggregating over the entire data set and
controlling for daily price fluctuations, we identify the seasonal component in natural
gas pricing by observing which months, on average, have the highest prices. These
average monthly deviations are reported in table 1.5. We find that contracts which
expire in December and January are the most costly indicating a strong empirical
regularity in the data that must be modeled. We make heavy use of this fact in later
sections of the paper when we suggest an alternative procedure for pricing natural
gas options.
1.4.2 Evidence from Options
While we have shown that much about gas's representative stochastic process can
be learned from direct study of spot and futures' prices, an examination of options
can shed further light on the nature of the underlying process. Specifically, it is
difficult to identify the presence of jumps if one only observes discretely sampled paths
of the underlying asset's price. Unless the sampling frequency is extremely high,
wherein market microstructure effects would almost certainly have the unintended
consequence of obscuring the result, jump and continuous processes are essentially
indistinguishable. Carr and Wu (2003b) addressed a similar problem in equity markets
and developed a technique for differentiating between a purely continuous process
(PC), pure jump process (PJ), and a combination of the two, or continuous jump process
(CJ). Since the presence of jumps in the underlying's process can have substantial
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Table 1.6: Asymptotic Behavior of Short-Maturity Options
Process Type OTM Options ATM Options
PC O(e-C/I), c >0 O(V/)
PJ O(T) O(TP),p E (0,1]
CJ O(T) O(TP),p E (0, ]4
impact on the value of derivatives, it is important to identify their existence in order
to develop an accurate pricing model. In this section, we employ Carr and Wu's
methodology to demonstrate that in fact gas shows evidence of switching between PC
and PJ/CJ regimes.
While the interested reader is directed to the original paper for technical details,
the basic idea underlying the Carr and Wu's test is simple: short-dated option prices
are highly dependent on the presence of jumps. As an example, out-of-the-money
(OTM) options with near-term maturities have little chance of recovering any value if
the asset on which they are written follows a purely continuous stochastic process.
However, if the process admits jumps, the OTM option may retain considerable value
depending on the magnitude and frequency of those jumps. Carr and Wu extend this
intuition and show via analytical derivation and simulation, the behavior of at-the-
money (ATM) and OTM options as the time to maturity approaches zero. There results
are summarized in table 1.6 where the 0(0) follows the standard Landau notation
regarding asymptotic speed. 19 Carr and Wu find that the asymptotic behavior is
always exhibited by options maturing within 20 days.
The analysis is nicely captured in term decay graphs which plot the log of the ratio
of option prices to maturity, !, against log maturity, log . As the contract approaches
expiration, ATM options evidence zero slope in the presence of a finite variation PJ
model and a negative slope in the PC or CJ cases where jumps are of infinite variation.
In contrast, OTM options are characterized by zero slope in the PJ case and positive
slope in the PC case. In order to estimate the slope coefficient, we fit a second-order
polynomial
In() =a(lnT)2 + b(ln)+ c
to the plots where C is the call price. Consequently, the slope of the graph at a given
InT is given by 2a ln() + b.
Empirical Results
Following the procedure laid out by Carr and Wu (2003b), we estimate the term
decay graphs at four log moneyness levels: k = ln(K/F) = 0%, 3%, 6%, 9%. However,
before we produce plots and accompanying polynomial fits, we first filter the data in
19f = O(g) should be interpreted as lim sup f < oo.
X-oo g
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Table 1.7: Daily Breakdown of Process Types
PC, PJ, and CJ refer to Purely Continuous, Pure Jump, and Continuous Jump processes respectively.
Figure entries reflect the percentage of days within the associated time period that evidence a given
process.
Process October-December January-September
PC 89% 0%
PJ 0% 47%
PJ/CJ 0% 41%
Indeterminate 11% 12%
Total 100% 100%
several ways. In addition to requiring that options contracts have sufficient volume
for inclusion, we ensure that there are enough contracts with different strikes for
each maturity that interpolation of call prices is possible. Finally, we guarantee that
we can fit meaningful regressions to this interpolated options data set by dropping all
days in which there are an inadequate number of contracts at the same moneyness
level. We display some sample plots in figure 1.5. The top panel suggests that options
on December 7, 2004 followed a PC process given the downward sloping OTM plots
and flat ATM plot as contracts approached maturity. In contrast, the bottom panel
provides evidence that options on March 10, 2005 have a jump component. Given that
the plots of the OTM options are not downward sloping, we can largely rule out the
possibility of the presence of a PC process on that day.
Table 1.7 summarizes the key result of this section: the stochastic process for
natural gas shows evidence of the intermittent presence of jumps. Specifically, the
table shows that 89% of the days between October 1 and December 31 in our scrubbed
data set follow a PC process while the remaining 11% of the days provide indetermi-
nate evidence for the process type. Conversely, between January 1 and September
30, 88% of the days show evidence of jumps while the remaining 12% of days offer
no information. On about half of the days on which we can make inferences, there is
evidence of a diffusion component as well. Perhaps the most striking result is that
in the October-December period there is not a single day in which the potential for
jumps are present while during the January-September period there are zero days on
which options prices suggest gas follows a purely continuous process. Finally, one can
observe that the periodicity in the presence of jumps overlaps with the seasonality of
prices discussed in Section 1.4.1. There we found that prices seem to follow a seasonal
pattern wherein spot prices rise in the months of December and January. Carr and Wu
concluded from their study of S&P index options that equities too appear to fluctuate
between regimes with different combinations of jump and continuous components.
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1.5. RISK-NEUTRAL MEASURE
1.5 Analysis Under the Risk-Neutral Measure: Risk
Aversion
The nature of investors' attitudes toward risk plays a subtle yet important role in the
derivation of option pricing models. In the standard Black-Scholes-Merton framework,
for example, we derive the price of an option using Girsanov's Theorem. The change
in measure, of course, only affects the drift term in the stochastic differential equation
governing the evolution of the underlying asset; the diffusion component is unaffected
and equal to its analogue under the objective measure. However, as one relaxes the
Black-Scholes-Merton assumptions and allows for jumps or stochastic volatility, the
measure transformation becomes more complicated and intrusive. If, for example,
volatility is thought to be stochastic and follow a mean-reverting process, the measure
transformation will affect not only the asset's drift, but the mean-reversion speed
and level of the volatility term as well. Likewise, the risk-neutral description of
an asset which includes a jump component differs from its real-world counterpart
in its jump frequency and jump amplitude. In fact, Rebonato (2004) shows how
even in the absence of jumps and stochastic volatility, the introduction of realistic
conditions governing supply and demand imbalance can sever the equality between
the deterministic volatility term under the risk-neutral and objective measures. To
the extent one believes these departures from the Black-Scholes-Merton world are
significant enough to impact market prices, one cannot afford to ignore investor
preferences when constructing models for option prices.
The precise link between investors' tolerance for uncertainty and the risk-neutral
parameters in option models is complex and model-dependent. Nonetheless, estimat-
ing risk aversion can play a very important role in helping to evaluate the validity
of a derivative pricing model. For example, in the case of a jump-diffusion model,
Lewis (2002) derives a closed-form expression linking the risk aversion of a power-
utility investor with the real-world and risk-neutral jump frequencies and amplitudes.
The paper shows that risk-averse investors perceive negative jumps with greater
frequency and amplitude under the risk-neutral measure than under the objective
measure. Intuitively, this makes sense as one would expect risk-averse investors to be
compensated for bearing greater risk. Rebonato (2004) recommends that practitioners
make use of this result in several ways. Starting with some prior on risk aversion, a
derivatives trader who finds risk-adjusted jump frequencies of five times per month
with downward jumps of 80% should question the soundness of his model unless
he imagines the representative investor to be extremely risk-averse. In the event
the trader cannot estimate risk aversion with great precision, he can still make use
of Lewis's observation by estimating the real world values of jump frequency and
amplitude and then choosing bounds on the value of the risk aversion coefficient.
Next, he can simply evaluate the corresponding risk-neutral parameters implied by
these previous calculations and compare them to those implied by his model. To the
extent that these two sets of estimated parameters differ, he might again call into
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question his model specification or his parameter estimation procedure.
A careful consideration of risk aversion can also be of help in evaluating stochastic
volatility models. However, in contrast with the jump-diffusion case, the implications
are more model-specific. Lewis (2000) shows that in models with square-root or
GARCH volatility combined with power utility, options prices vary with levels of
risk aversion depending on the sign of the correlation between the asset price and
volatility. With zero correlation, risk aversion varies inversely with option value but
with positive correlation, increases in risk aversion correspond to higher price levels.
The important point is that complex models with many parameters can be difficult
to estimate. Thus parameter restrictions informed by an understanding of risk
aversion can greatly improve overall model calibration and hopefully the model's
ability to recover out-of-sample prices. Given the importance of understanding investor
attitudes towards uncertainty in pricing derivatives, we modify approaches taken
in Jackwerth (2000) and Aft-Sahalia and Lo (2000) to estimate risk aversion in gas
markets.
1.5.1 A Simple Model
Following Constantinides (1982) and Merton (1992), we consider a complete market
economy with heterogeneous agents and note that the competitive equilibrium is
equal to that arising from a representative investor with utility function U(.). The
agent is endowed with one unit of wealth at time t and faces a fixed time horizon
T. In equilibrium, the agent holds all of his wealth in gas. His problem, as posed in
Jackwerth (2000), is:
max f U(WT)P(WT)dWT - A f WTQ(WT)dWT - 1)
where WT is wealth at time T, A is the shadow price of the budget constraint, r is
the gross interest rate, Q(.) is the risk-neutral probability distribution, P(-) is the
objective probability distribution, and ST is the spot price of gas at time T.
The well-known equilibrium result arising from this simplified version of Merton's
optimization problem is
U'(ST) = Q(ST) (1.1)
r(T-t)P(ST)
where the time index has been dropped for notational convenience. If we then differen-
tiate equation 1.1 a second time and solve for the coefficient of relative risk aversion,
p, we find
ST A (Q'(ST)P(ST)-Q(ST)P'(ST))
STU"(ST) r_ -t) P2(ST) STP'(ST) STQ'(ST)
U'(ST) AQ(ST) P(ST) Q(ST)r(T-t)P(ST)
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Estimating Risk
We estimate p in a two step process. First, we find Q(.) by making use of the observa-
tion in Breeden and Litzenberger (1978) that the risk-neutral distribution is equal to
the discounted value of the second derivative of a European call option taken with
respect to the strike and evaluated at the spot price of the underlying asset. 20 21 This
somewhat surprising result is quite easily understood.22 Recall that options can be
priced under the equivalent martingale measure, Q(.), as
CT,K(t,S) = e - r(T- t)Q fK(ST)St = S} = e-r(T- t) f fK(s)Q(s)ds
where S is the spot price, K is the strike price, fK is max(x - K, 0), t is the initial time,
and T is the time of expiry.
Next, note that
OfK(x)_J -1 ifK <x
-K 0 ifK>x 
This in turn implies that
O2 fK(x)
= 6x(K)OK2
where x, denotes the Dirac delta function over x. If we then permit the interchange of
derivatives and integration, we get our result:
2CT,K(t,S) = er(T-t) K(x)Q(x)d
= e-r(T-t)f K-fK(x)Q(s)dx
= er(Tt) f 6x(K)Q(x)dx
= e-r(T-t)Q(K)
where the last equality follows from the definition of the delta function.
Q(ST)= er(T-t) 02 CT,K(tS)OK2  K=ST
20Although we are dealing with options written on futures in this context, as NYMEX option contracts
and their underlying futures expire at the same time, the result carries through unaffected.2 1Note that there is some inconsistency in the literature as to what is meant by the term "state price
density". While Dufflie (2001) and Shreve (2004) equate the SPD to the ratio of the risk-neutral density
and the objective density multiplied by a risk-free discount factor, other sources such as Ait-Sahalia
and Lo (1998) use SPD to mean the risk-neutral density itself. We adhere to the latter convention in
this paper.22This nice derivation follows that of Carmona (2004, p. 221).
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Next we estimate P(0), the objective distribution of prices, using a kernel density
estimator in the spirit of Ait-Sahalia and Lo (2000).23 24
1.5.2 Results and Implications
The estimated risk aversion functions are shown in figure 1.6 along with the 95-
percentile confidence intervals for these estimates using the procedures outlined in
Ait-Sahalia and Lo (2000).25 While the optimal bandwidth procedure plays some role
in determining both the shape and levels of the plots, two features are prominent and
robust. First, the coefficients are small and second, they are meaningfully different
than what studies have generally found to be the case in equities markets. We
estimate the average value of the relative risk aversion coefficient to be 0.02. The
implication is that investors in gas markets are virtually risk-neutral. In contrast,
while Hansen and Singleton (1982) and Hansen and Singleton (1984) find that relative
risk aversion in equity market varies between -1 and 1, other more recent papers such
as Mehra and Prescott (1985), Ferson and Constantinides (1991), Ait-Sahalia and Lo
(2000) find evidence for substantially higher risk aversion levels. Mehra and Prescott
(1985), for example, cites work done by Fisher Black indicating that the risk aversion
coefficient is around 55. Ait-Sahalia and Lo (2000) finds that relative risk aversion in
equities is on average about 13. In addition, the authors' nonparametric procedure
suggests that the value of the coefficient varies over wealth; risk aversion appears to
be as high as 60 at low wealth levels and close to five at average wealth levels. This
too suggests a difference between equities and gas as our analysis indicates that risk
aversion is essentially constant over wealth and much closer to zero.
Our results seem to offer further evidence for market segmentation. While basic
finance theory suggests that there is but one representative investor with a single risk
profile, comparisons between the risk aversion levels embedded in gas and equities
indicates otherwise. One possible explanation for the low level of risk aversion in gas
relates to the inherent market structure. While equities markets boast substantial
23The procedure involves using a kernel density estimator on the time-series of T-period returns.
This density estimator then can easily be transformed into the conditional density of prices. We use
this method to estimate the objective probability distribution P(.). For more details, see Section 4 of
Ait-Sahalia and Lo (2000).
24For the entire nonparametric analysis, we follow Ait-Sahalia and Lo (1998) and choose band-
widths according to the rule they develop which gives the proper rate of convergence of the estimator
allowing asymptotic analysis to hold; we choose bandwidth hx for the estimation of 7r(x) such that
hx = cxs(x)n- 1/(d +2(q+m )) where cx yx/log(n) (yx constant), s(x) is the standard deviation of x, n is
the number of observations, d is the number of regressors, q is the order of the kernel, and m is the
number of derivatives we are estimating.
25Using the results of Aft-Sahalia and Lo (2000), nl/2h7/2 1h/2hs/2 (t(FT) -pt(FT)) d Xk(O0,u2) where
-
2  2  f* F T, C(2 r(/),Y) f 22 O-2 . s2( f\ k )2()dw )(f-O k2 (w)dwJ)(f- k2J(w)djw)
p oF/(f d3d *' d3T * -  T(iD)Ft
Also see Section 1.7 for a more detailed discussion of the kernel estimation approach we employ
in order to estimate the underlying densities needed to construct our risk aversion estimates.
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Figure 1.6: Plot of Risk Aversion
The figure plots the relative risk aversion estimated via a kernel regression. The solid line represents
the estimated coefficient while the dashed line represents the 95 percent confidence interval.
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retail investor participation, NYMEX is almost exclusively the domain of institutional
investors. A single futures contract often costs tens of thousands of dollars so it
comes as no surprise that day-traders and average consumers steer clear of this asset
class. One might further conjecture that institutions enjoy greater diversification
opportunities, better access to information, and less susceptibility to behavioral biases
than that of retail investors. Consequently, they transact in markets with markedly
less risk aversion.
1.6 Existing Models
In this section, we examine three popular and representative models from the com-
modities literature. While the models price futures contracts with reasonable success
(see table 1.8), we show that their failure to incorporate the various features high-
lighted in the previous sections leads to dramatic pricing errors in options markets.26
26To actually estimate the futures prices in table 1.8, we use the Kalman filtering algorithm for the
Schwartz and Smith and Todorova models and the volatility functions for the Clewlow and Strickland
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Table 1.8: Errors of Parametric Models in Pricing Futures Contracts
The table reports the root mean squared errors (RMSE) and the RMSE as a percent of the average
price (Percent) for the 1 month, 4 month, and 8 month futures contracts using data from 2003-2005
future prices. The RMSEs are denominated in dollars.
Model 1 Month 4 Month 8 Month
Schwartz and Smith RMSE 3.735 3.144 2.554
Percent 47.768 38.388 32.900
Todorova RMSE 3.791 3.169 2.588
Percent 48.484 38.693 33.338
Clewlow and Strickland RMSE 0.320 0.250 0.150
Percent 4.088 3.054 1.936
The first two options models are derived from parametric assumptions of the underly-
ing spot price while the third yields an option price based on modeling the evolution
of the forward curve through time.
1.6.1 Modeling the Spot
The first model we consider is developed in Schwartz and Smith (2000) wherein
the spot price, St, is written as a function of two stochastic factors: an equilibrium
price, ýt, and Xt, a short-term deviation around that level. In logarithmic form,
the relationship is linear and formulated as InSt = Xt + ýt. Changes in ýt, which
includes a drift component, reflect long-term shifts in supply and demand as well as
the effects of inflation, regulatory developments, and the inevitable improvements in
finding, extraction, and distribution technologies. Consequently, the associated SDE of
equation 1.2 is that of a standard diffusion process. The short-term deviations around
the equilibrium level arise from temporary supply shocks, themselves the result of
inclement weather or other hiccups in production or distribution. It is natural, then,
that Schwartz and Smith let Xt follow a mean-reverting Ornstein-Uhlenbeck process
as reflected in equation 1.3 where K is the mean-reversion coefficient. The authors
further assume that shocks to ýt and Xt are correlated increments of Brownian Motion
which yield equation 1.4 where pxý is the correlation coefficient.
model. The Kalman filter approach involves first estimating the parameters of the process using the
entire data set and then computing one day ahead filtered prediction of the futures prices. For the
Clewlow and Strickland model, we note that equation 1.13 gives a relationship between today and
tomorrow's prices. Using this relationship we can calculate tomorrow's expected price given today's
price. For the volatility functions, we again allow mild stationary and reestimate them on a rolling 30
day basis.
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dft = Medt + aodzý (1.2)
dXt = -KXtdt + axdzx (1.3)
dctdxt = pxedt (1.4)
Schwartz and Smith show that this set-up implies that Xt and ct have a jointly
normal distribution while St has a lognormal distribution. In order to derive derivative
prices, the authors also evaluate the dynamics of the the two factors under the risk-
neutral measure. They reason that the correlation between changes in the state
variables and aggregate economic wealth is zero and thus that risk adjustment results
in simple corrections to the drift terms as reflected in equations 1.5 and 1.6.
dct = (yý - Aý)dt + aodz* (1.5)
dXt = (-KXt - AX)dt + axdz* (1.6)
Here, the * indicates that the corresponding variable is evaluated under the risk
neutral measure while Aý and Ai/r represent the "market price of risk" associated
with ýt and Xt respectively. This model together with the assumption that interest
rates are independent of spot gas prices allows for the simple calculation of futures
prices as the expectation taken with respect to the risk-neutral measure of the future
spot price. This leads to equation 1.7,
In(FT,t) = e-x(T-t)Xt + ýt + A(T- t) (1.7)
A(T- 0 = (pý - 1)(T-t)-(1 -e-K(T-t)) - X
+ 1 (1-e-2(T-t) (T - t)+ 2(1- e-K(T-t))Pxa u x a )2 2K + -
where FT,t is the time t price of a futures contract expiring at time T. Under the
risk-neutral model, futures prices are still lognormal with variance ou but mean po
where
po(t, T) E* [ln(FT,t)] = e-K(T-t)Xt + ýt + (Yt - A,)(T - t)+ (1- e - (T - t)
au(t, T) Var* [ln(FT,t)]= (1- e-K(T-t) X + a2(T - t)+ 2(1- e-K(T-t) Px 0 xa ý (1.8)
and Xo and ýo are initial value of Xt and ýt respectively.
Since the state variables, Xt and it, are unobservable, Schwartz and Smith es-
timate the parameters of the model using MLE where the likelihood function is
computed via a Kalman filter. The details of this procedure, which involves first
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recasting the model in a discrete state space framework, are outlined in Appendix 1.A.
Finally, the authors apply basic Black-Scholes-Merton methodology to derive a
closed form expression for the value of a call option on a futures. Explicitly, the price
of a call option with strike K expiring at time t on a futures contract expiring at time
T is
e-r(T- t)(FT,tJ(d) - KA(d - ao(t, T))) (1.9)
where d = log(FT,tK) + (t, T) and X(.) is the standard normal cumulative distribu-where d 2 (
tion function. We use this pricing formula in conjunction with our MLE estimates of
K, Ux, au, and Px. to estimate the prices of all of the traded options in our data set.
We report our findings in Section 1.6.3.
It is important to note the ways in which this model departs from the realities
of the actual natural gas markets given what we documented in Sections 1.4 and
1.5. First, the model asserts that the evolution of both spot and futures prices are
lognormal at all horizons. This clearly is at odds with our observation that returns
are only Gaussian when calculated on a monthly basis but evidence non-normality
over shorter intervals. Second, Schwartz and Smith do not allow for seasonality of
returns which is another important feature of the data. Third, their paper imposes
constant volatility despite substantial evidence to the contrary, and fourth, makes no
provision for the possibility of jumps in the price level. Finally, as the result of these
overly, albeit simplified, assumptions, Schwartz and Smith are able to show that the
model's formulation under the risk-neutral measure amounts to trivial adjustments
to the drift terms of the two state variables. In light of the discussions in Sections
1.4.1, 1.4.2, and 1.5, we can conclude that the true risk-neutral dynamics are likely to
be more complex.
Arguably the easily rectified potential shortcoming of Schwartz and Smith's paper
is its failure to incorporate the presence of seasonality in the price of gas. To determine
whether or not the explicit consideration of seasonality improves the model's ability to
recover market prices, we rely on a model introduced in Todorova (2004b). Todorova
essentially picks up where Schwartz and Smith leave off and treats seasonality in
several different ways. One method she implements with mixed success involves
adding a third factor, seasonality, to the Schwartz and Smith framework. While this
leads to a nice closed form option pricing formula, the model struggles to recover
futures prices due to the substantial number of additional parameters that require
estimation. 27 A second approach is to estimate the Schwartz and Smith (2000) model
having first deseasonalized the data. To preprocess the data in this fashion, Todorova
proposes a procedure outlined by Kendall and Ord (1990) which involves detrending
the data and looking at price deviations in order to identify seasonal components. The
27While Todorova did not explicitly do so, we derived an expression for the value of a European option
based on her three factor model. The expression is straightforward but the addition of a third factor
introduces significantly more parameters to estimate. Consequently, the estimation procedure yields
extremely unstable results with our data set. Therefore we do not report any results using this method.
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process then reintroduces any time trends resulting in a data set with the seasonality
removed. To avoid the curse of dimensionality inherent in the first approach, we
utilize the deseasonalization strategy in this paper.
To implement Todorova's model, we begin by deseasonalizing the data as previously
described. This produces a futures price series that has the seasonal component
removed. We then proceed to estimate the model in the framework of Schwartz
and Smith (2000) since we assume the deseasonalized data follows the assumptions
regarding the dynamics of the process made in that paper. This estimation procedure
produces estimates of the parameters of the stochastic process that underlie the
deseasonalized data rather than the true stochastic process. However our method of
deseasonalization only modifies the underlying process by changing the first moment
via adding a nonstochastic constant, therefore neither the distribution nor the variance
of the process changes and the option pricing formula derived in equation 1.9 remains
valid with the parameters estimated from the deseasonalized price series.
Though Todorova's approach certainly attempts to address the issue of seasonality,
it is open to all but one of the same critiques as Schwartz and Smith (2000). Namely,
that it fails to incorporate non-normality and stochastic volatility in returns as well
as the presence of discontinuities in prices. As a consequence, its formulation for the
dynamics under the risk-neutral measure are almost certainly overly simplified.
1.6.2 Forward curve model
In contrast to Schwartz and Smith (2000) and Todorova (2004b) which rely on struc-
tural specifications of the underlying spot process, Clewlow and Strickland (2000)
derives option prices by modeling the entire forward curve. First, the authors posit
a model of the forward curve wherein each contract is a linear combination of n
independent sources of uncertainty. Formally,
dF(t, T) n
= • i(t, T)dzi(t) (1.10)F(t, T) t=1
where F(t, T) represents the time t price of a futures contract maturing at time T
while ai(t, T) and dzi(t) equal that contract's ith volatility function and ith source of
risk respectively. Next, the authors extend the model to markets with substantial
seasonality in prices by modifying equation 1.10 to incorporate a time dependent spot
volatility function. Now,
dF(t, T) n
= as(t) E ai(T - t)dzi(t) (1.11)F(t, T) t=l
where as(t) captures seasonality.28
28Notice in moving from equation 1.10 to equation 1.11 we have replaced Ui(t, T) with Ui(T- t) which
is essentially an assumption on the stationarity of the process; we are assuming that volatility only
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We follow the procedure outlined in Appendix 1.C to estimate both the time
dependent and individual factor volatility functions. In short, we use the rolling 30 day
sample standard deviation to find as(t). Estimating the individual volatility functions
is more complex and relies on converting the stochastic process in equation 1.11
to a logarithmic form and then discretizing it. This allows us to utilize Principal
Component Analysis by constructing a covariance matrix of forward returns. Next,
we compute an eigenvector decomposition of this matrix scaled by our estimated
spot volatility such that we can recover independent factors that drive the forward
curve. A simple transformation of these factors and their associated eigenvalues
gives us the discretized volatility functions.29 One can also use the eigenvalues of
the decomposition to choose the number of volatility functions necessary to model the
forward curve with desired accuracy. In this paper we use five volatility functions
which seem to capture most of the variation in the covariance matrix of returns.
Once we have estimated the volatility functions, it is straightforward to price
options assuming interest rates are nonstochastic. The authors derive a closed-form
formula for the price of a European call option at time t,
c(t,F(t, T),K, T) = e - r (T - t) (F(t, T)A(h) - KIs(h - vw)), (1.12)
where K is the strike price, and both the option and futures mature at time T. Further,
log(F(t, T)/K) + w n (fT 2h = , w = t ai(u,T)2du .Wi=l
We calculate one day ahead option prices by first estimating the volatility functions
on a 30 day rolling basis to allow for mild nonstationarity.30 This procedure produces
volatility functions for each trading day which in conjunction with equation 1.12,
enables us to price any options that trade on that day.
On one level, Clewlow and Strickland (2000) seems less intellectually appealing
than the fully parametric approaches taken in the first two papers considered. It is
not clear, for example, how to interpret the volatility functions except to understand
them as weights on opaque "sources of risk." However, the trade-off is in the model's
comparative flexibility as it imposes none of the rigid structure on futures volatility
depends on the length of time until expiration rather that the specific values of t and T. This is
an important assumption without which we could not use historical data to estimate the volatility
functions. In our actual estimation procedure we do allow for mild non-stationarity by estimating the
volatility functions using rolling data.
29 Since this technique relies on a stochastic process without jumps, we also follow Clewlow and
Strickland (2000) and apply what their paper terms a "recursive filter" to remove data points that
appear to be generated by a jump. The actual implementation relies on repeated calculations of the
sample standard deviation and filtering out observations that exceed an arbitrary threshold scaling of
that sample standard deviation. We use 3 standard deviations, but find the results are not extremely
sensitive to the choice.
30We apply the recursive filter on each of these returns to filter out possible jumps.
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included, for example, in equation 1.8. In addition, as with Todorova's model, Clewlow
and Strickland's approach explicitly incorporates seasonality, one of gas's important
characteristic features. It too, however, fails to permit stochastic volatility and
because changes in futures prices are modeled as linear combinations of Brownian
increments, returns will necessarily be Gaussian over all horizons. Both of these
features contradict the empirical evidence. Finally, by construction, the forward-curve
model fails to admit the possibility of jumps even though we have seen that prices
behave as if they follow a jump process during certain months of the year.
1.6.3 Empirical Results
We evaluate the models' success in reproducing actual options prices in three ways.
First, we compare the models' predictions with the actual prices in terms of root
mean-squared error (RMSE). Next, we examine performance by measuring slippage
with respect to a delta-hedged portfolio. Finally, we offer a visual exposition of the
degree of mispricing by comparing the volatility surfaces implied by the candidate
models with the actual implied volatility surfaces calculated in Section 1.3.2.
Table 1.9 reports the RMSE of the different estimators. As one would expect, the
models tend to price ITM options better than ATM and OTM contracts. Nonetheless,
it is readily apparent that overall the three models price the options quite poorly with
the average mispricing often exceeding 100% of the average option price. Although it is
not directly observable from the RMSEs, some of the models exhibit quite pronounced
tendencies in mispricing. For example, the Clewlow and Strickland (2000) model
generally predicts option prices which are too low, while Schwartz and Smith (2000)
typically over-prices the options. It is also interesting to note that the models have
biases with respect to time to expiration. Table 1.10 shows that the Schwartz and
Smith and Todorova models tend to price more distant options accurately while the
Clewlow and Strickland approach better recovers the prices of short-term options.
One can also assess a pricing model by evaluating the relative magnitude of
the tracking errors associated with a delta-hedged portfolio. Let A represent the
derivative of an option-pricing formula with respect to the underlying security. For
the models in this section, we can calculate this derivative analytically.3 1 Given A, we
can construct a portfolio of the underlying futures and a riskless bond that exactly
replicates the option's payoff assuming continuous time. More formally, to construct
this portfolio for each option, let t = 0 be the time at which the option was first traded
31For the nonparametric model introduced in the next section, we must resort to calculating this
derivative numerically.
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and let
Vs(O) = F(O)A(O)
Vc(O) = -C(O)
VB(O) = -(Vs(O) + Vc(O))
where F(t) is the futures price, C(t) is the call price on that future, Vs(t) is the values
of the futures in the portfolio, VB(t) is the value of the bonds, and Vc(t) is the values
of the call options.3 2 By construction, at t = 0,
V(o) = Vs(O) + VB(O) + Vc(O) = 0
and then we calculate V(t) with
Vs(t) = F(t)A(t)
and
VB(t) = erd VB(t - 1)- F(t)(A(t) - A(t - 1)).
The tracking error is then defined to be V(T) where T is the date of expiry of the option.
Finally, we define a performance measure ý = e-rTIV(T)I which is the present-value
of the tracking error. In table 1.9, we average these tracking errors over different
types of options to illustrate how well the various option pricing formulas perform. We
find that by this measure as opposed to RMSE, the model in Clewlow and Strickland
(2000) enjoys a substantially smaller performance advantage vis-a-vis the models of
Schwartz and Smith (2000) and Todorova (2004b); the mean absolute tracking error
of Clewlow and Strickand's approach is $0.23 compared with that of $0.29 for both
Todorova and Clewlow and Strickland.
A final instructive approach to measuring the efficacy of the pricing models is to
compare their implied volatility surfaces. As in Section 1.3.2, we use the result from
Black (1976) to estimate the implied volatility surfaces.33 We reproduce representative
samples of these surfaces in figures 1.7 and 1.8. These figures clearly show that the
parametric models do not seem to yield the regularities we see in the actual data. In
particular, the models fail to capture the relationship between moneyness and implied
volatility.
32We follow the notation of Hutchinson, Lo, and Poggio (1994) for this section.
33Just as before, we use a series regression in order to approximate the function for plotting purposes.
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Table 1.9: Errors of Models
RMSE represents the root mean squared error of the estimated option price compared to the actual
option price. TE represents the mean absolute tracking error of a delta-hedged portfolio. Total
represents the error over all options, while ITM, ATM, and OTM represent the errors of in-the-money,
at-the-money, and out-of-the-money options respectively. Both the RMSEs and the TEs are denominated
in dollars.
Model
Schwartz and Smith (2000)
Total
ITM
ATM
OTM
Todorova (2004b)
Total
ITM
ATM
OTM
Clewlow and Strickland (2000)
Total
ITM
ATM
OTM
RMSE TE
2.044
1.922
2.209
2.143
2.090
1.965
2.257
2.194
0.425
0.367
0.537
0.459
0.292
0.211
0.203
0.365
0.293
0.211
0.203
0.367
0.233
0.174
0.200
0.291
Table 1.10: Errors of Models by Maturity
Table entries represent the root mean squared errors of the estimated options prices compared to the
actual options prices. Maturities, denoted by T, are in months. SS denotes Schwartz and Smith (2000),
T denotes Todorova (2004b), and CS denotes Clewlow and Strickland (2000). The entries in the table
are denominated in dollars.
Maturity SS T CS
T< 1Month 2.746 2.882 0.159
15 < 2 2.475 2.585 0.314
2 T <3 2.302 2.387 0.456
3 T <4 2.206 2.270 0.499
4 T < 5 2.116 2.163 0.524
5 sr <6 2.041 2.075 0.503
65 <7 1.998 2.022 0.401
7 T < 8 1.940 1.957 0.386
8sT <9 1.896 1.908 0.409
9 5 T < 10 1.874 1.882 0.447
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Figure 1.7: Model Implied Volatility Surfaces for May 2005
Actual Data for May 2005 Schwartz and Smith for May 2005
Todorova for May 2005 Clewlow and Strickland for May 2005
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Figure 1.8: Model Implied Volatility Surfaces for November 2005
Actual Data for November 2005 Schwartz and Smith for November 2005
Todorova for November 2005 Clewlow and Strickland for November 2005
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1.7 Nonparametric Approach
1.7.1 Set-Up
As demonstrated in the previous subsection, the parametric pricing models we have
considered neither price options well nor capture the relationships between moneyness,
time to maturity, and implied volatility exhibited by the actual data. Thus, we suggest
an alternative nonparametric approach to pricing these options inspired by Alt-
Sahalia and Lo (1998). The advantage of using a kernel-based regression is that
we avoid structural restrictions. As a result, we can theoretically capture all of the
important features of gas including the seasonality, non-normality, and time-varying
volatility of returns as well as the presence of jumps.
The biggest challenge facing the application of kernel techniques is the curse of
dimensionality. With just under 40,000 observations, we reduce the complexity of the
problem by estimating a, the implied volatility of Black (1976), via a kernel regression
and then calculate option prices by simply inverting Black's formula. Further, we
select as our state variables, the futures price, the strike price, time to maturity, and
seasonality.34 This fourth regressor is a simple measure of seasonality: the month the
option expires. 35 In addition, we standardize all of the state variable by de-meaning
them and dividing each by their respective standard deviations; this allows us to
use a common bandwidth, b, for each element in the kernel's tensor product. As
the choice of the kernel function generally does little to affect the outcome of the
estimation procedure, we employ a multivariate Gaussian kernel. Formally, we use
these assumptions along with the Nadaraya-Watson kernel estimator which yields:
Eý k( FtT-FtiT )k('t_" k )k(TTi)k('t- )r
6(Ft,T,Kt,T,St) = 1 b(Fb-Ft)(K-K
where Ft, is the futures price as of time t of a futures contract expiring in T periods,
Ki represents the strike price, Ti represents the time to the option's maturity, St
represents the month that the option expires, and k(.) is the univariate Gaussian
kernel. We can then calculate the price of a call option, C, as
C(Ft,F,Kt,T,rt,,) = CBlack76(Ft,T,Kt, ,rt,.; S(FtKt,t ,  t))
34In contrast to traditional parametric econometric approaches, there is no omitted variables bias
with kernel techniques. See Alt-Sahalia and Lo (1998, p. 507).
35We also tried several other combinations of state variables. For example, we combined the futures
price and strike price into a single variable, moneyness, in order to reduce dimensionality. Also, rather
than allowing seasonality to enter more generally as the month of option expiry, we tried incorporating
seasonality as a dummy variable taking on the value of 1 in the case of December/January expiry
and zero otherwise. This seasonality regime was determined based on the findings in Section 1.4.
Combinations of these approaches all performed more poorly than the seasonality factor/four state
variable set-up we use in the main body of the text.
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where CBlack76 is the price of a call given by the model in Black (1976). As with
our implementation of Clewlow and Strickland (2000), we allow for some degree of
nonstationarity by recalculating ^ every day on a 30 day trailing basis.
1.7.2 Results
As reflected in figure 1.11, this model leads to lower RMSE and tracking errors than
any of the parametric approaches considered in the previous sections.36 In fact, in
terms of RMSE on OTM options, the kernel method improves upon the Clewlow
and Strickland (2000) approach by 83% and outperforms the Todorova (2004b) and
Schwartz and Smith (2000) models by a 96% margin. In addition, this nonparametric
approach suffers no bias with respect to term-structure; the RMSEs are around
0.05 over all maturities. The improvements, as measured by slippage with respect
to a delta-hedged portfolio, are also quite substantial. The kernel estimator yields
slippages that are 72% better than that of Clewlow and Strickland and 124% better
than that of either Schwartz and Smith or Todorova.
In addition, the nonparametric model produces implied volatility surfaces which
more closely approximate actual surfaces. We reproduce a representative sample of
these implied volatility surfaces in figure 1.9. Comparing these plots with those in
figures 1.7 and 1.8, it is immediately clear that the nonparametric approach captures
the key features of implied volatility in the dimensions of moneyness and time to
maturity that other models do not.
Finally, figure 1.10 and table 1.12 offer an important insight into why the kernel
method is more capable of pricing options correctly than the parametric approaches
considered. Figure 1.10 plots the SPDs in return space rather than price space. In
valuing options using martingale pricing techniques, it is these densities rather than
the real-world densities that are relevant. Table 1.12 displays the moments of the
risk-neutral distribution of the futures returns at expiry. The Black (1976), Schwartz
and Smith (2000), Todorova (2004b), and Clewlow and Strickland (2000) approaches
all yield Gaussian distributions while the unrestricted kernel approach allows for
negative skewness and kurtosis. Since option prices are far more sensitive to tail
distributions than, for example, futures prices, it reasonable to conclude that much of
the advantage of using the kernel regression method stems from its inherent ability
to capture higher moments of a distribution in a way that parametric models derived
from Brownian motions cannot. Further, it is easy to understand why the parametric
models are more capable of recovering future price than option prices as noted in
Section 1.6.3. With nonstochastic interest rates, futures prices equal the expectation
36As is standard with kernel regressions, the results are heavily dependent on the choice of bandwidth
b. While there is a literature on "optimal" bandwidth selection, it is not clear that these techniques are
more sound than simply applying rules of thumb in small samples. The RMSE of our model varies
depending on the choice of bandwidth, but is lower, and in most cases substantially lower, than those of
the other models for any reasonable value of b. The results in the table use the bandwidth of b = 0.25.
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Table 1.11: Errors of Nonparametric Model
RMSE represents the root mean squared error of the estimated option price compared to the actual
option price. TE represents the mean absolute tracking error of a delta-hedged portfolio. Total
represents the error over all options, while ITM, ATM, and OTM represent the errors of in-the-money,
at-the-money, and out-of-the-money options respectively. Both the RMSEs and the TEs are denominated
in dollars.
Panel A: RMSE and Tracking Error
Model RMSE
by Option Type
TE
Alt-Sahalia and Lo (1998)
Total 0.067 0.184
ITM 0.055 0.140
ATM 0.074 0.212
OTM 0.077 0.211
Panel B: RMSE by Time to Maturity
Maturity
T < 1 Month
15_<2
6 ST <7
9 < 10
RMSE
0.055
0.063
0.078
0.071
0.063
0.047
0.053
0.057
0.051
0.060
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Figure 1.9: Nonparametric Estimated Implied Volatility Surfaces for May 2005 and
November 2005
Alt-Sahalia and Lo for May 2005 AIt-Sahalia and Lo for November 2005
under this same risk-neutral density of the spot at the contract's expiry. However,
the expectation is applied directly to the spot price rather than the maximum of zero
and the difference of the spot price and the strike as is the case with options. Put
another way, the futures price is less sensitive to skewness and kurtosis. In sum, the
simplifying assumptions used in parametric models examined in this paper, while
arguably justifiable when pricing futures, are a substantial liability when trying to
price options.
1.8 Conclusion
Though it has received comparatively little attention from economists, natural gas is a
remarkably important commodity that quite literally powers our lives. Its significance
will surely grow with time as will the associated financial derivatives markets. In
recognizing that gas prices behave differently than those of other commodities let alone
those of equities, bonds, or currencies, we have attempted in this paper to document
gas's unique properties with the aim of building better derivatives models. A direct
examination of futures prices revealed evidence of strong seasonality in prices as well
as stochastic volatility and the absence of strict normality in returns. Next, we used
options prices and a technique borrowed from the recent equity derivatives literature
to show that the underlying commodity exhibits regime-switching behavior in its
stochastic process; gas prices evolve according to a purely continuous process during
the months of October, November, and December, while they evince a combination of
pure jumps and jump-diffusions during the remainder of the year. In addition, option
prices embed a great deal of information about investors' attitudes towards risk. Using
a simple model of investment, we find that investors in gas markets are virtually
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Figure 1.10: Estimated SPD-Generated Densities for Continuously Compounded
Returns
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Table 1.12: Moments of SPD-Generated Densities for Continuously Compounded
Returns
The table gives the mean, standard deviation, skewness, kurtosis of various models. The nonparametric
estimate refers to that derived from kernel density estimation, BS to that from the model of Black
(1976) calibrated to to the realized means and variance, SS to that from the model of Schwartz and
Smith (2000), T to that from the model of Todorova (2004b), and CS to that from the model of Clewlow
and Strickland (2000). The entries in the maturity column are measured in months.
Model
Nonparametric
BS
SS
T
CS
Nonparametric
BS
SS
T
CS
Nonparametric
BS
SS
T
CS
Nonparametric
BS
SS
T
CS
Maturity
1
1
1
1
1
2
2
2
2
2
4
4
4
4
4
6
6
6
6
6
Mean
-0.006
-0.004
-0.446
-0.483
0.000
-0.015
-0.008
-0.461
-0.490
0.000
-0.026
-0.016
-0.480
-0.497
0.000
-0.028
-0.023
-0.490
-0.500
0.000
Std. Dev.
0.138
0.113
0.892
0.966
0.014
0.161
0.159
0.921
0.980
0.018
0.180
0.225
0.959
0.995
0.021
0.184
0.276
0.981
1.001
0.021
Skewness
-0.190
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
-0.141
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
-0.101
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
-0.117
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
Kurtosis
-0.798
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
-1.406
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
-1.699
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
-1.724
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
CHAPTER 1. NATURAL GAS MARKETS
risk-neutral over all levels of wealth. This differs from what numerous other papers
have observed in equities leading one to conclude that markets are likely segmented.
Further, an understanding of risk can prove helpful in calibrating derivatives models
as well as evaluating their validity.
We also consider three representative models from the literature and find that
while they are effective in forecasting futures, they are unable to accurately recover
option prices. We attribute this to their failure to fully incorporate all of the stylized
facts highlighted in the first part of the paper. Finally, we introduce an alternative
method for pricing gas options based on a kernel regression. We show that this
approach, while nonparametric and thus unable to provide the sort of economic
intuition of the other models considered, is far more effective in accurately pricing
options out-of-sample.
1.A Appendix on Estimating Schwartz and Smith
and Todorova Models Using a Kalman Filter
In this approach, we discuss the model of Schwartz and Smith (2000) for concreteness
since the extension to that of Todorova (2004b) is quite simple. Calculating options
prices using Schwartz and Smith's approach requires that we first estimate the
parameters in equations 1.5 and 1.6. This can be accomplished by discretizing each
equation, rewriting the dynamic system in state space form, and finally, since the
state variables x and ý are unobservable, making use of Kalman filtering techniques
to construct a likelihood function which we can maximize over our parameters.3 7
Comprehensive textbook treatments of the Kalman filter can be found in Hamilton
(1994), Zivot and Wang (2003), and Brockwell and Davis (1990). This appendix is
meant to serve as a brief overview as it applies to our problem.
We begin with our transition equation which describes the evolution of the state
variables
xt = c + Gxt-1 + (t for t = 1,...,nT
where,
xt [Xt,4t]', a 2 x 1 matrix of unobserved state variables,
ct [Ot,utAt]', a 2 x 1 vector,
G = , a 2 x 2 matrix,
nT number of time steps,
At - length of a time step, and
wt a 2 x 1 vector of mean zero, serially uncorrelated, and normally distributed distur-
37See Bingham and Kiesel (2004) for more on discretizing continuous functions for maximum
likelihood estimation.
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(1 e-2KAtN• -2xAt)Px'XOra'bances with Var[wt] = W - Cov[(XAt,QAt)] = (1- e-2xAt)xA (1• e2at pxHx( e-2KAt)PAx' a 2A 4
The measurement equation links the state variables with the observed futures
prices. Here we have,
Yt = dt + Flxt + vt, for t= 1,...,nT
where,
Yt = [lnFT1,...,lnFT,]', an n x 1 vector of (log) futures prices with maturities Ti,
dt E [A(T1),..., A(Tn)]', ann x 1 vector,
eKT1 1
F t an n x 2 matrix, and
eK1 1
vt, an n x 1 vector of mean zero, serially uncorrelated, normally distributed innovations
with Cov[vt] = V.
Next, the Kalman filtering algorithm is used to compute forecasts xtlt-1 and Ytlt-1
where the hat and subscript notation denotes linear projections of x and y on their
respective vectors of lagged values. If we assume that the initial state, x1, and
the disturbances { ot,Vt}=l are Gaussian, then one can show that Xtlt-1 and Ytit-1
are optimal forecasts among any (not just linear) functions of yt-1. Further, the
distribution of Yt is conditionally normal,
YtlYt-1 ~ dY((F'Xtlt-1), (F'Ptlt-lF + V))
where,
Ptlt-1 E[(xt+l -Xtlt-1)(Xt+l -Xitlt-1)' ]
Pllo = E[(xl - Xi)(xt+I - Xtlt-1)']
This in turn allows us to construct the sample log likelihood function
T
Slogfytlyt-1(YtlYt-1)
t=1
which we can maximize in order to find c, G, d, and F and in turn K, Ax, ox, p/t, AY ,
au, and Px,"
1.B Appendix on Todorova and Kendall Deseason-
alization
As discussed in Section 1.6.1, Todorova (2004b) is interested in incorporating season-
ality into the models of several commodity price processes. To that end, Todorova
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modifies the Schwartz and Smith (2000) framework by first fitting the model to a
deseasonalized price series and then adding back the seasonal component to the
forecasted prices.
We follow the procedure outlined by Todorova (2004a, Appendix E) which in turn is
derived from Kendall and Ord (1990, Chapter 4) in order to deseasonalize the futures
data. Let Ft,, denote the mid-month time series of futures that expire in T months.
Since the futures prices seem to exhibit a time trend, that trend must be removed
before seasonality can be estimated.3 8 Let
1(1 1
t = - -Ft-6, + Ft-5,T +Ft-4,T + + Ft+4,T + Ft+5,T + -Ft+6,~
be the moving average used to estimate the time trend component r^it. Given the time
trend, we can compute the detrended time series xt,r as
xt,r = Ft,1 - ^ t.
Given the the detrended data it is simple to estimate a monthly seasonal component
sj defined as
sj = xj,7 -i
where xj,t is the average detrended price for calendar month j across the years of
the sample and i is the average detrended price (i = E~pij,). Finally we compute
the deseasonalized price series Ft,T as Ft,1 - sj. We use this deseasonalized, but not
detrended, process for estimation using the Kalman filter.
1.C Appendix on Clewlow and Strickland and PCA
Analysis
In this appendix, we provide additional details regarding the procedure we used for
estimating the Clewlow and Strickland (2000) model. The authors' approach is to
model the entire forward curve through time by specifying that the process is composed
of n independent volatility functions, each parameterized by the current date and
the maturity date, with uncertainty introduced by n number of random shocks which
are assumed to be Brownian increments. These assumptions are represented in the
stochastic process given by equation 1.10. It is worth noting that this parameterization
is fairly general and does not assume any functional forms for the volatility functions
save for modelling of shocks as Brownian increments.
To actually estimate these volatility functions, additional assumptions must be
made. First, as we have noted, gas exhibits seasonality which we can incorporate
38For the mid-month prices, we use the realized price closest to the 15th of each month, so t =
April 15,May 15,June 15,....
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into the model quite easily by introducing a time-dependent seasonality adjustment
factor which can be proxied by the spot volatility. Second, while we need not introduce
functional form restrictions on the volatility functions, we must reduce some of the
time dependence of their parameterization in order to estimate them with historical
data. To do so, instead of allowing the functions to be dependent on both t and T, the
current date and the maturity date respectively, we only allow them to depend on
T - t = T, the time to maturity. The estimation procedure itself determines the number
of volatility functions. These two restrictions yield equation 1.11.
At this stage, we have a model for the futures curve evolution with two components
to estimate. First, we must estimate the spot volatility and second we must estimate
the volatility functions. For the first task we proceed as suggested by the authors and
construct rolling estimates of the spot standard deviation by calculating the sample
standard deviation of the shortest maturity contract's daily returns on a 30 day rolling
basis.
To estimate the volatility functions, we follow the authors who apply Ito's lemma
in logarithmic form after the futures prices have been normalized with the rolling
volatility as we have previously described. The authors discretize the resulting
equation giving us
AlogF(t,t + j)= -- (t,t + )2 At + a(t,t + )Azi (1.13)
2 i=1 i=1
where At is one day, logF(t, t + Tj) is the price of the futures with the jth maturity
at time t (Tj would, for example, be one month or two months), and n represents
the number of volatility functions. It is worth noting here that the assumptions we
have made so far imply that the left-hand side of equation 1.13, AlogF(t, t + Tj), is
jointly normally distributed for all of the different maturities. Also, it is clear that
the left-hand side is simply the daily continuously compounded returns of the futures
contract. Given we are continuing to assume that the stochastic process does not have
jumps, before continuing, we take a detour and review a filtering procedure that must
be undertaken before proceeding with estimation.
Since it is assumed in the formulation of this model that the underlying stochastic
process is one without jumps, returns which appear to violate this assumption can
adversely affect estimation. To mitigate this potential problem, we apply a "recursive
filter" to the data to remove suspected jumps before estimating the parameters of the
stochastic process as suggested by the Clewlow and Strickland. First, we calculate a
time series of daily returns for contracts of each maturity as well as the associated
sample standard deviations. Next we assert (somewhat arbitrarily) that returns
beyond a threshold of three standard deviations constitute a jump and are accordingly
eliminated from the data set. Then, we recalculate the sample standard deviations and
again eliminate observations associated with potential jumps as previously defined.
We repeat this procedure for 10 iterations. As 12 different futures contracts trade
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each and every day, we must apply this procedure separately for each contract.
As A logF(t, t + Tj) is simply the daily continuously compounded return of a futures
contract, to estimate the volatility functions we begin by constructing the covariance
matrix of these returns which we denote It. To allow some time dependence we
estimate these covariance matrices on a rolling 30-day basis. These covariance
matrices are then decomposed using an eigenvector decomposition into two pieces: a
matrix of eigenvalues and a matrix of eigenvectors. Thus we decompose It as
It = rFtAtF
with
on i V in) Al 0 0
t = and At= 0 ".
,Vnl .. Vnn 0 0 An)
where Ft is a the matrix of eigenvectors and At is the diagonal matrix of associated
eigenvalues. The relative size of the eigenvalues determines the extent to which that
eigenvalue and its associated eigenvector (the factor) explains the variance of the
sample returns and thus provides a method for choosing an appropriate number of
volatility functions; in practice we choose 5 volatility functions for most estimations.
The actual volatility functions are recovered by simple algebra from the decomposition
as
ai(t,t + T1) = vji /\ .
Armed with the volatility functions, we can completely characterize the evolution
of the forward curve through time. Furthermore due to the assumptions regarding
the forward curve given in equation 1.11, we know that logF(t, t + Tj is normally
distributed. Since the log-transformed futures prices are normally distributed, we
can apply the standard Black-Scholes-Merton approach and derive a closed-form
option price which the authors undertake thereby deriving equation 1.12. Since we
have estimated the volatility functions at each time t as outlined in this appendix
and estimated appropriate interest rates as detailed in Section 1.3.3, it is then
straightforward to price the options in the data set using this formula.
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Chapter 2
Rethinking the Home Bias Puzzle:
A Two-Step Approach
With Erik C. Ruben
Abstract
This paper presents new estimates and approaches to estimating the home bias puzzle.
We use micro-level data to calculate households' foreign equity exposure as a function
of wealth. We find simple estimates have significant errors-in-variables problems and
we construct an estimator using grouping to account for this issue. Our estimates
still imply low aggregate investment in foreign equity. Finally, we disaggregate the
investment decision by incorporating two step decisions that allow households to forgo
participating in the market. As a result of the decoupling, we find foreign equity levels
closer to that of standard portfolio theories.
2.1 Introduction
In their 1991 paper "Investor Diversification and International Equity Markets,"
French and Poterba (1991) quantified the strength of one of the most curious and
enduring empirical irregularities in open economy macroeconomics: the Home Bias
Puzzle (HBP). Their paper presented strong evidence that aggregate equity portfolios
in industrialized countries were heavy biased towards domestic stock ownership
relative to the predictions of standard portfolio optimization models. While subsequent
papers including Bohn and Tesar (1996), have found that the HBP has diminished
somewhat since French and Poterba published their results, the magnitudes of the
bias in most countries are still far too great to be accounted for using standard
explanations.
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Most investigations into the HBP have utilized aggregate data. This paper takes
a different approach in that we use individual investor level data to examine asset
allocation decisions. Moreover, we add to the existing debate over the source of the
HBP by disaggregating portfolio selection into two components: first, the binary
decision to participate in international markets and second, the conditional foreign
asset allocation choices. Whereas previous investigations into the HBP have tried
to explain why investors on average hold seemingly low shares of foreign assets, we
show that conditional on their choosing to participate in foreign markets, investors
construct portfolios with much higher levels of foreign holdings. Thus, the interesting
question regarding foreign asset ownership shifts from one of portfolio share to one of
participation in international markets. In addition, we find that while the conditional
portfolio allocations to foreign assets are somewhat independent of wealth levels, the
participation decision is closely tied to investor affluence.
Using detailed household-level data provided by the Survey of Consumer Finances
(SCF), we structure our investigation by first studying the interplay between individ-
uals' portfolio decisions and their levels of net financial wealth. Simple econometric
analysis suggests little relationship between wealth and unconditional foreign equity
ownership. However, we show that this is the result of an errors-in-variables problem
and we discuss the implications and caveats associated with this conclusion. Finally,
we decouple the participation and conditional portfolio decisions and provide some
evidence that the real empirical "puzzle" is the binary decision of whether or not to
invest.
We will proceed as follows. In the next section, we highlight some of the important
insights and approaches in the extensive literature and show how they relate to this
paper. In Section 2.3, we discuss our data and their relevant statistical properties.
Section 2.4 lays out our estimation procedure for the unconditional investment decision
and the associated problems in measuring this choice. Section 2.5 estimates the
participation decision and conditional portfolio choices. Section 2.6 concludes.
2.2 Literature Review
Even prior to French and Poterba (1991), financial economists1 asserted that investors
hold insufficient foreign assets relative to that suggested by traditional portfolio theory
models such as the international version of the capital asset pricing model (CAPM).2
Most often these older studies used macro level data to estimate the home bias. Often,
as is the case with the original French and Poterba (1991) article, the home bias
was estimated using accumulated capital flows and valuation adjustments. However
there is evidence that these flows are not well suited for estimating the home bias.3
1 See, for example, Levy and Sarnat (1970).
2See Sharpe (1964) and Lintner (1965) for the original development of these models.
3 See Warnock and Cleaver (2003).
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In March of 1994 and again in December of 1997, the U.S. government conducted
comprehensive studies of its residents' foreign security holdings by surveying major
custodians and other large investors.4 Using this data, Ahearne, Griever, and Warnock
(2004) estimates that foreign equities comprise 12 percent of US investors' equity
portfolios (using 1997 data). For comparison, French and Poterba (1991) estimate that
share to be about 6.2 percent at the end of 1989 and Bohn and Tesar (1996) estimate
the share at nearly 8 percent in 1994. Thus there is some evidence that while home
bias in the US has lessened substantially over the last twenty years, US foreign equity
holdings are still much lower than levels predicted by standard portfolio theory.
Numerous attempts have been made to explain the HBP by loosening typical
assumptions like the existence of a representative consumer, riskless borrowing, and
complete markets or by more explicitly modeling the gains from diversification.5 One
simple approach is to consider the possibility that domestic equities provide a better
hedge for home country specific risks. However models in this spirit generally predict
lower levels of home bias than observed. Another form of country specific risk could
be related to non-tradable assets such as human capital. For example, Stockman and
Dellas (1989), finds an equilibrium in which a country's residents derive little benefit
from diversification via claims indexed to nontradable endowments because investors
capture all the available gains from diversification by investing in claims linked to
tradable goods. However, others have found that this approach is unlikely to provide
a sufficient explanation for the HBP. Another version of the nontradables idea was
offered by Bottazzi, Pesenti, and van Wincoop (1996) which argued that given the
negative correlation between labor income and returns on capital, domestic stocks
may provide a better hedge against consumption volatility than international equities.
This explanation seems unlikely given the findings of Mankiw and Zeldes (1991) which
previously showed that wealthy investors, who constitute a large portion of equity
holders, care little about hedging labor income. Lucas (1987) tried a different approach,
claiming that observed aggregate consumption volatility is insufficient to justify
much international investing in the face of even minor transactions costs. Lucas's
paper, however, relied heavily on the assumption of a trend stationary consumption
process and at best only explains the HBP for the United States which experiences
unusual consumption smoothness. Further, because it only considers aggregate
decision-making, Lucas's approach ignores individual heterogeneity and the fact that
individuals cannot as easily hedge away idiosyncratic risk and thus may have more
motivation to hedge than a representative consumer. There is also a substantial
literature that tries to explain the HBP in the context of diversification costs, but
many authors have found large gains from international diversification even when
taking these costs into account. Another possible explanation relates to simple
mismeasurement. Gains from international diversification are derived from historical
means and variances, but limited data leads to significant uncertainty regarding
4 See Griever, Lee, and Warnock (2001) for a discussion.
5 For a more comprehensive look at the literature, see Lewis (1999) for a recent survey.
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these measures and hence the existence of a home bias. Lastly, Ahearne, Griever,
and Warnock (2004) believe the underweighting of foreign equity in US portfolios is
primarily due to significant information costs.
The present paper does not try to explain the home bias in the traditional sense,
but rather redefine the puzzle. To do so, we investigate individual portfolio choices
as opposed to the aggregate measures the other studies have used. This allows us to
examine the interplay between investors' decision-making process and their individual
characteristics including wealth levels.
2.3 Data
The U.S. household level financial data used in this paper are taken from the Federal
Reserve's Survey of Consumer Finances. The most recent publicly available version
of the SCF, which is conducted every three years, was compiled in 2001. While
the Fed has been conducting the survey for decades, it only started collecting data
on our primary variable of interest, U.S. household ownership of foreign assets,6
in 1995. Thus, this paper restricts itself to data from the 1995, 1998, and 2001
surveys. The SCF, which utilizes a dual-frame sample design, offers the most complete
obtainable description of U.S. family finances. The survey designers selected about
4,0007 household participants using a dual-frame methodology. The first group of
families were selected from a standard multi-stage area-probability design devised
to ensure proper representation of broad characteristics like home ownership. The
second group of families were chosen based on Internal Revenue Service data to
get disproportionate representation of relatively wealthy Americans. Given the
limited survey size, the inclusion of this set of subjects is critical to ensuring proper
representation of a concentrated yet significant agglomeration of national wealth and
in particular foreign asset ownership.
The SCF has two important features which deserve mention as they have very
significant ramifications for performing any sort of econometric analysis on the data.
First, the observations do not have equal associated probability and therefore must be
weighted before trying to interpret the survey data. The SCF designers constructed
the weights using original selection probabilities and frame information as well as
information available in the Current Population Survey; the weights sum to the
number of households 8 in the sample universe. 9 In addition, the study suffers from
missing data. To remedy this, the surveyors opted to impute missing values by
6The Fed collects both foreign stock and foreign bond ownership; it does not collect information
regarding other forms of foreign financial asset ownership (e.g. derivatives, mutual funds, etc.) nor
does it provide more detailed information regarding portfolio choices.
7The number varies slightly by year.
8In 1998, the number of households, and hence sum of weights, was 102.5 million
9This is from the survey documentation; see http: / /www. f ederalreserve. gov/pubs /os s /
oss2 / 98 /scf 9 8home. html (Kennickell, 2000)
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drawing repeatedly from an estimate of the conditional distribution of the data
and then storing these imputations as five successive replicates, or "implicates," of
each data record. As a result, the full dataset has five times the actual number
of respondents: for example, in 1998 there are 21,545 observations versus 4,305
households. The survey designers argue that multiple imputation promises more
efficient estimation than singly-imputed data because it generates multiple outcomes
from a stochastic process. In addition, with multiple imputation, users can estimate
the level of uncertainty associated with the missing information. Estimation, of
course, requires some care since each data record contains five implicates which are
not independent observations.
We provide some sample statistics in table 2.1 for the SCF data sets from 1995,
1998, and 2001 that we use in this paper. The table illustrates that weighting is
crucial to properly interpreting the data set and any statistics derived from it; the
difference between weighted averages and simple averages is substantial. Also, of
interest is the relatively small number of observations that actually report owning
foreign assets. Although members of these households constitute a significant portion
of the total population when weighting is taken into account, the fact that there is
only a small number of these observations makes estimation problematic especially if
there are errors present.
2.4 Estimation of Unconditional Investment Deci-
sion
2.4.1 Simple Models and IV
The first step in offering an explanation for the HBP is to examine the relationship be-
tween wealth and foreign stock ownership at the individual household level. Defining
y as foreign equity holdings, we are interested in the following regression function:
Yi = x'p + ci (2.1)
where x' is a k-dimensional vector specifying the ith observation's characteristics.
These characteristics can include various factors (home ownership, trust ownership,
sex, etc.), but most importantly include financial wealth. First, let yi be dollar-
denominated foreign stock holdings and xi net financial wealth and other demographic
variables of the household including education, age, and whether the household
received professional financial advice. The results are tabulated in table 2.2. These
results are striking in that only FIN is significant. This is a rather surprising result
given that one would think that better informed households, either through education
or professional advice, would diversify their portfolio holdings and realize the potential
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Table 2.1: Sample statistics of SCF datasets
Statistic Variable Implicate 1995
Year
1998 2001
Number of observations 4299 4305 4442
Sum of weights 1 99,010,458 102,548,840 106,495,827
2 99,010,458 102,548,841 106,495,822
3 99,010,458 102,548,842 106,495,762
4 99,010,458 102,548,843 106,495,808
5 99,010,458 102,548,847 106,495,827
Average 99,010,458 102,548,842 106,495,809
Observations FA > 0 1 236 264 288
2 235 272 287
3 234 263 290
4 238 265 290
5 239 265 289
Average 236.4 265.8 288.8
Weighted Mean Foreign Assets 1 327.5265 1,393.268 1,544.332
2 323.1702 1,167.291 1,481.277
3 293.2713 1,104.691 1,516.466
4 333.4674 1,302.647 1,575.255
5 399.1033 1,213.458 1,469.048
Average 335.3077 1,236.271 1,517.276
Weighted Mean Financial Wealth 1 92,806.6 133,547.2 191,869.5
2 91,652.16 137,320.6 189,474.2
3 91,964.38 132,478.4 192,905.4
4 89,009.1 139,878.0 186,775.0
5 93,069.14 131,053.4 192,230.0
Average 91,700.28 134,855.5 190,650.8
Unweighted Mean Foreign Assets 1 18,094.44 47,711.53 94,184.64
2 15,588.47 45,271.71 89,610.38
3 18,712.08 44,969.76 88,969.61
4 19,853.45 42,882.48 94,104.70
5 14,833.23 44,804.12 100,138.44
Average 17,416.33 45,127.92 93,401.55
Unweighted Mean Financial Wealth 1 1,681,018 2,165,496 2,920,921
2 1,675,034 2,184,691 2,830,215
3 1,699,617 2,175,257 2,841,817
4 1,744,324 2,143,680 2,946,908
5 1,718,128 2,216,238 2,870,094
Average 1,703,624.03 2,177,072.29 2,881,990.87
"Observations FA > 0" refers to observations who have positive foreign equity holdings.
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Table 2.2: OLS regression results: multiple independent variables
Intercept
FIN
Professional Advice
Education
Age
1995
-336.0259
(1425.6189)
0.0037452***
(0.0006839)
84.449086
(438.67514)
34.246357
(80.208039)
-3.512104
(-3.512104)
Year
1998
1973.86
(4462.2167)
0.0150006***
(0.0020877)
-148.343
(1580.2427)
-138.492
(272.35948)
-17.72655
(44.495354)
2001
21304.198**
(10672.252)
0.0340929***
(0.0032153)
-3104.597
(3809.7003)
-1199.743*
(654.64935)
-176.1148
(107.34792)
Table 2.3: Results from simple regression.
II Year
1995 1998 2001
Intercept -8.7353
(225.4055)
FIN 0.00375***
(0.0007)
-776.3679
(785.9162)
0.0149***
(0.0021)
-4,836.696***
(1,856.3869)
0.0333***
(0.0032)
*** significant at 1% level, ** significant at 5% level, * significant at 10% level. Numbers in parentheses
are standard errors. This regression takes into account all five implicates and adjusts the coefficient
estimates and standard errors appropriately.1"
gains that other authors have found with international diversification.l 0 Hence, we
will proceed by letting our independent variable be only financial wealth (FIN). The
results are tabulated in table 2.3.
The table clearly shows, not surprisingly, that wealth is strongly related to foreign
10We have also looked at numerous other explanatory variables and combinations thereof including
use of a professional financial adviser, ownership of a trust, sex, home ownership, and equity in one's
company, among others. The results for these regressors are consistent with the results we report
in table 2.2: regressions involving wealth and other potential explanatory almost always produce
statistically insignificant coefficients estimates for those other factors. This itself is a very interesting
result and probably deserves a fuller discussion, but is somewhat outside the scope of this current
paper.
11See Montalto and Sung (1996) for a discussion of the theory of properly adjusting for multiple
implicates in the regression context.
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investment level. For example, in 1995, households invested in foreign assets about 0.4
cents of each incremental dollar of wealth. Three years later, investors were allocating
about 1.5 cents on the the dollar to international holdings. By 2001, the marginal
rate of foreign investment had risen to about 3.3 cents. 12 In sum, the coefficient
estimates of marginal foreign investment level, though significant, are quite small
and imply foreign equities as a share of total financial assets at a lower level than
the original work that established the home bias and thus implying an even larger
home bias. There is strong reason to believe, however, that these small coefficient
estimates may be partially attributable to measurement error as mismeasurement
in explanatory variables yields downwardly biased coefficient estimates. 13 While
uncertainty over the existence of a subset of good instruments means we cannot
use a standard test to check for the failure or orthogonality, we have two reasons to
believe that measurement error presents a particularly acute problem in this dataset.
First, anecdotal analysis suggests inconsistencies in the data. For example, there are
households in the dataset whose foreign equity holdings exceed their gross financial
wealth holding. This is clearly a nonsensical result. Second, when we employ an
instrumental variables approach to correct for potential measurement error of the
covariates using labor income and housing wealth as our instruments, the coefficients
increase in magnitude. The results are reported in table 2.4.
Using both labor income and housing as instruments, we find that the coefficient on
foreign investment increases approximately fourfold in 1995, twofold in 1998, and 14%
in 2001 from the simple regression reported in table 2.3. Thus this standard approach
for correcting errors-in-variables does increase the magnitude of the point estimates.
There is, however, significant concern with using the instrumental variables approach
for if financial wealth is measured with error, it is likely that instruments are as
well. This suggests that the instruments are correlated with financial wealth and
thus are invalid instruments. Since it seems likely that we have invalid instruments
and thus inconsistent point estimates, we will move forward and attempt to estimate
the relationship between foreign equities and financial wealth using a different
approach. In the spirit of Wald (1940), the basic idea is to average across observations
within a wealth range. Assuming no correlation among observations 14 and given our
relatively large sample, this strategy would be expected to "average away" much of
the measurement error. Essentially averaging across observations reduces random
disturbance in magnitude and will hopefully eliminate the errors-in-variables problem
thereby allowing us to produce consistent coefficient estimates. There is, of course,
12 It is worth noting this coefficient changed by a large margin from 1995 to 2001, but further
exploration of this result is outside the scope of this paper.
13Hausman's "Iron Law;" holds when error is uncorrelated with true value. For a fuller discussion of
this result see Greene (2002, Section 9.5.2) and Wooldridge (2002, Section 4.4.2).
14This is not much of an assumption in a cross-sectional data set if you believe in random sampling
and its correct application; the survey design, however, introduces two-stage samples, but we still have
no reason to believe we do not have a random sample and hence uncorrelated disturbances across
observations.
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Table 2.4: IV regression results
Instruments
Labor Income Intercept
FIN
Housing Intercept
FIN
Both Intercept
FIN
1995
Year
1998 2001
-10370.8*** -29094.9*** 13409.14
(3128.043) (6228.006) (14295.06)
0.016311*** 0.034093*** 0.027756***
(0.000817) (0.001781) (0.003473)
-5246.41* -35898.3*** -18476.5*
(2989.843) (5550.908) (10822.75)
0.013303*** 0.037218*** 0.038820***
(0.000741) (0.001118) (0.001395)
-7591.03***
(2938.709)
0.014679***
(0.000612)
-34446.9***
(5452.211)
0.036551***
(0.001037)
-16241.9
(10808.89)
0.038044***
(0.001376)
The "Instruments" column denotes which instruments were used in the regression.
a tradeoff here: averaging across observations reduces the number of observations
we can use in our regression analysis. Averaging across observations can eliminate
much of the uncertainly regarding the actual values of the explanatory variables (if
measured without error), but averaging too much will significantly reduce the size
of the sample on which we can perform regression analysis and hence give results
that, although are asymptotically consistent, have not yet converged to the population
values.
2.4.2 Grouping
More formally, our approach is to avoid estimating equation 2.1 directly and instead
estimate
yi =&'Ij+ei (2.2)
where the variables are defined as follows. Let X be a n x k matrix, where n is the
number of observations and k the number of explanatory variables.15 x' is a column
vector containing the observations of the ith individual. It is important to draw the
distinction between implicates and observations; where needed, we will use a second
subscript to denote implicates hence the jth implicate for observation i is denoted
x' . Let Y denote the n x 1 column vector of the associated response variables and wij
15Although we develop the more general case of a k explanatory variables, the empirical results only
include a single explanatory variable.
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represent the n x 1 column vector giving the weights wi for each observation i; these
weights attempt to estimate the relative effect of each observation on the variance. 16
Let i . represent the weighted average of m observations. Thus
-, E-lwlxl
These averages should be computed separately for each implicate giving rise to a
vector (indexed by j) of i. Similarly, define
= I=lwlyl
which is simply the weighted average of m dependent variables. Continuing this
averaging process we can obtain a matrix X and a column vector Y.
We will assume the equation 2.1 satisfies the standard large sample consistency
assumptions (i.e. the linear model is correct, X'X is non-singular, and plim •) = 0.)
However, we will allow that our sample have a non-spherical covariance matrix
and is characterized by heteroscedasticity across observations i17 . In particular, we
suspect the heteroscedasticity will be a positive function of the financial wealth. Thus
var(elX) $ a2 I and instead (2 00)
var(elX) = ( (2.3)
where ao is an increasing function of financial wealth. Note that we impose zero
covariance between observations since we assume, given the SCF survey methodology,
that the data set is a random sample.
If the underlying model expressed in equation 2.1 satisfies the large-sample
consistency assumptions, then the the transformed regression model expressed in
equation 2.2 also satisfies those assumptions and therefore least squares will provide
a consistent estimate of P. The presence of heteroscedasticity, however, means that
OLS applied to the original regression model as well as the transformed model will
not be asymptotically efficient even in the class of linear estimators. The motivating
point, however, is if the model expressed in equation 2.1 does not satisfy large-sample
consistency assumptions which is likely given measurement error and the resulted
correlation between the dependent variable and the disturbance. In this case, though,
OLS on the transformed model may produce consistent estimates while OLS on the
16 Recall the our data set is an unequal probability design hence we must take into account the
weighting to get accurate results.
17Notice there is necessarily heteroscedasticity across observations in X
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original may not due to errors-in-variables. By averaging away errors in variables,
we can construct a transformed model that we can estimate with OLS and produce
consistent point estimates.
In this paper we use two alternative approach to grouping observations prior
to averaging. The first approach assigns the same number of observations in each
grouping. We order the observations by net financial wealth and then, in that ordering
assign, the first m observations into the first group, the next m observations into
the second group, and continue in this manner for all of the observations. This will
produce a data matrix of size m x k and a response vector of size A x 1. 18 In is
worth noting that the consistency of the averaging approach does not depend on the
grouping method. The grouping method will, however, affect whether averaging can
help alleviate the errors in variables problem. Indeed by first ordering the data set
by wealth and then grouping equal numbers of observations we can appeal to the
similarly of observations with similar wealth levels to net out errors in variables in
the data. One possible problem with the first approach to grouping is the weighting
associated with our dataset. As seen above in the construction of elements of Xk, each
group has associated with it a weighted size which is significantly different than the
number of observations in each group. In particular, consider a group on the low
mean financial wealth and another with a high mean financial wealth, given the
financial wealth distribution implied by the data the former group will represent
significantly more households than the latter. This fact motivates the second form of
grouping we use in the paper. Rather than create groups than have the same number
of observations, we can construct groups that would have approximately the same
implied size in population terms. In concrete terms, we can construct groups where
the sum of the weights in each group is approximately equal.19 We will use both
grouping methods in this paper and the choice of grouping methods does not matter
for much of the paper, although we will draw distinction when we use a particular
method or if there are significant differences between the methods.
Results
In previous sections we have attempted to estimate the incremental changes in foreign
equity holdings for increases in net financial wealth. Thus we have attempted to
estimate the following equation:
FAi = Po + i1(FINi)+ ei (2.4)
18Integer constraints will cause some difficulty here. Generally the last group will have fewer than
m observations in it and the associated average will have to be adjusted accordingly.
19Since every observation has an associated population weight different than one, it is not possible to
create groups with equal implied population weight. Instead we attempt to construct groups where the
associated population weights are as near to each other as possible.
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where FAi is investor i's level of foreign equity holdings (Foreign Assets) and FINi
is an individual's net financial wealth. We have attempted to estimate this equation
using standard OLS and IV approaches with less than satisfactory results which we
believe is due to a significant errors in variables problem; when FIN is measured
with error OLS does not produce consistent coefficient estimates and the increase
in coefficient estimates we saw by using IV provides some evidence of this. As we
have noted, IV is not without problems and, in particular, may itself be inconsistent,
so we have introduced an estimator using averaging in section 2.4.2. We will use
this approach to again estimate equation 2.4. This method should reduce errors in
variables and hence can produce consistent, but not asymptotically efficient, results.
We construct estimates using various group sizes and utilizing the first grouping
method, using equal number of observations per group, discussed in section 2.4.2. The
results from this approach are summarized in table 2.6.20
Table 2.6 shows that the averaging approach doubled the point estimate of 2001
over the simple regression reported in table 2.3 and nearly doubled the IV regression
coefficient in table 2.4.21 These regression results, as well as the alternate quadratic
formulation
FSi = fo + fl(FINi) + f 2(FINi)2 + eC, (2.5)
reported in table 2.5 can be visualized in the figures on the following pages. For
example, figure 2.1 shows the graph of financial wealth versus the level of foreign
equity for both the models in equation 2.4 and equation 2.5 as well as the fitted
regression line with the 95 percent confidence interval shaded. The figures illustrate
the relatively strong explanatory power of financial wealth which can be seen visually
as well as evidenced through the high R2.22
Moreover these results, in particular the rather dramatic changes in coefficient
estimates provide strong evidence that our original OLS and IV estimates are not
very accurate. OLS, IV, and averaging followed by OLS are all consistent under the
standard assumptions and given our relatively large data set, it is unlikely that the
estimates should change so dramatically. Given the rather substantial difference
in coefficient estimates, we have strong evidence that the consistency assumptions
of OLS and IV are not satisfied. This result in particular furthers our believe that
this data set and the FIN variable exhibit significant errors in variables and thus
necessitates the need for more complicated estimation procedures such as we have
developed in this section.
20We report robust standard errors in the table.
2 1It is worth noting that the other coefficients do not seem to respond in the same way. Still, in
the presence of measurement error on explanatory variables, the original regression point estimates
reported in table 2.3 are not even consistent so this may be of little practical concern. We do not
currently explore the change in the regression coefficients over time.
22This result is also robust to logging the data which which results in a more uniform distribution of
financial wealth (the original data is nearly exponential in distribution).
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Figure 2.1: Level graphs.
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Table 2.5: Averaging OLS regression results
1995
391.1065
(535.4887)
0.0047656***
(0.0001819)
-2.19e-11***
(2.12e-12)
1998
-614.9783
(2725.747)
0.0151463***
(0.0007892)
-5.62e-12
(8.99e-12)
2001
-31729.07**
(14171.27)
0.0382529***
(0.0016108)
9.63e-11***
(4.38e-12)
Table 2.6: Averaging OLS regression results by group size
Bin Size
5 Intercept
FIN
10 Intercept
FIN
20 Intercept
FIN
50 Intercept
FIN
100 Intercept
FIN
1995
Year
1998 2001
-1142.6175 7911.0542 -77125.7695**
(3677.528) (9154.903) (37633.001)
0.006454614*** 0.013665547*** 0.065552486***
(0.000358704) (0.000713654) (0.002129313)
-514.903 6903.9853 -95686.9831**
(1458.548) (10979.162) (40786.623)
0.005007614*** 0.012663343*** 0.075210828***
(0.000138726) (0.000730178) (0.001906739)
1669.2806 12581.1962 -99113.6497
(1258.341) (6893.211) (38171.906)
0.003066427*** 0.006250884*** 0.074315601***
(0.000165774) (0.000369908) (0.001395326)
1426.1937 14809.7096* -46235.9569**
(1099.281) (8489.548) (21123.041)
0.003161702*** 0.005101461*** 0.048890705***
(0.000171369) (0.000305383) (0.001784175)
929.0174 15550.4591 -51119.5422**
(1014.659) (11137.517) (24500.412)
0.003656479*** 0.004729674*** 0.054054914***
(0.000214935) (0.000291107) (0.001599092)
Model
Quadratic Intercept
FIN
FIN2
The "Bin Size" refers to the number of observations in each group that are averaged together. This
corresponds to m in the notation of section 2.4.2. Each implicate is treated separately; the results are
then averaged to produce the results in this table.
L
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Discussion of Results
The averaging approach outlined in the previous section is not without problems.
There is a fundamental tradeoff between increased averaging to reduce errors-in-
variables and the resulting loss of variability in the transformed observations. In fact,
there are at least three effects that we must consider. First, increasing the size of the
group can eliminate errors-in-variables due to the law of large numbers since we more
observations allow a better estimate of group means. Second, increased averaging
reduces the overall variability of the transformed (grouped) data. This problem is
particularly acute in our data since most of the variability is in observations with high
wealth levels and, since these represent fewer observations, there is a resulting loss
of variability in the transformed data. Third, increased grouping reduces the number
of data points in the transformed data and hence leads to larger standard errors
following estimation. It is clear that groups must be of sufficient size to alleviate
errors-in-variables and hence produce consistent point estimates with OLS, but the
other two effects both imply too much grouping will not produce good results. Overall,
it is unclear the net direction of these three effects. We can, however, illustrate the
tradeoffs on our point estimates by looking at the estimated coefficients in equation 2.2
while varying the group size as we have done in figure 2.2. The first panel using
the same number of observations per group, while the second uses equal implied
population weight per group.
Also, estimating the relationship between wealth and foreign equity investment is
somewhat difficult when using levels. It would be beneficial to transform the variables
using logarithms and avoid the exponential like distribution of the variables in levels.
This transformation is not possible in our data set since, as we saw in section 2.3,
almost all of the observations in the data set have foreign equity of zero.
The main result in this section, however, is that we can utilize averaging to produce
consistent point estimates of the fraction of the marginal dollar invested in foreign
equities. It is worth noting that even in the best case the estimate of this quantity is
less than 8 cents on the dollar which, given the linear specification, corresponds to
a very small fraction of wealth invested in foreign equities. This result is consistent
with the previous literature showing that too little is invested in foreign equities, but
given our micro-level data we believe there is more that we can say. In particular,
the data illustrates that most households choose foreign equity holdings of zero and,
given this, perhaps we can disaggregate our total sample into two parts and look at
each part's decision separately as we do in the next section.
2.5 Estimation of Conditional Investment Decision
As we mentioned earlier in section 2.3, only a small number of observations actually
have positive foreign asset holdings. We were interested to determine whether we
could find characteristics of households that imply households would have positive
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Table 2.7: Participation regression results
Model
Linear Intercept
FIN
Quadratic Intercept
FIN
FIN2
1995 1998 2001
4.522679*** 4.99551*** 5.62112***
(.7132722) (.7984792) (9.8008032)
6.23e-07*** 5.88e-07*** 2.81e-07***
(7.29e-08) (7.63e-08) (2.13e-08)
3.432893*** 3.638101*** 4.569739***
(.57304) (.6230971) (.6915298)
2.16e-06*** 2.12e-06*** 8.01e-07***
(1.95e-07) (1.80e-07) (7.86e-08)
-1.88e-14*** -1.84e-14*** -1.46e-15***
(2.27e-15) (2.05e-15) (2.14e-16)
levels of foreign equity. To that end, we have found that the decision to invest a
positive dollar amount in foreign equities is strongly related to financial wealth.
Consider the following regression
participationi = Po + fl 1(FINi) + ri (2.6)
where participation is the fraction (in percent) of a group (in the notation of sec-
tion 2.4.2) that owns foreign equities and FIN is that group's (weighted) mean finan-
cial wealth. We report the results in table 2.7 and figure 2.3.23 The regression results
and figures show that participation is greatly influenced by wealth and only high
wealth levels induce significant participation. Indeed only in the higher quantiles of
the wealth distribution, do over half the quantile's members participate in foreign
equity markets. This observation leads to a theory that low aggregate levels of foreign
equity holdings are not just a matter of each investor choosing a suboptimal portfolio,
but rather the result of many investors failing to participate in the market at all.
Hence, perhaps there are significant information costs that investors must incur to
participate in foreign equity markets and these fixed costs lead to many investors
choosing not to participate at all. This hypothesis leads to the last component of this
paper.
As we have established, most households do not participate in the foreign equity
market, so the final stage in shedding a new light on the HBP is to disaggregate the
international market participation and portfolio allocation decisions. We decouple
these choices by only including in the analysis those portfolios which include nonzero
levels of foreign equity holdings. We estimate equation 2.2 using this subset of
observations and the same averaging approach employed in the previous section in
23We also report an alternative quadratic formulation: participationi = Po + 31(FIN)i + f 2(FIN)i + ri.
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Figure 2.3: Participation Regression Graphs.
1995 Participation
7 0
0**A..
* *
6 2.00ýo7 4.ooHo7 6. +07 8.00647
FIN ($)
95% CI - Fitted values
* yesfspct
1.00lO6
1998 Participation
* . 0* *0
*r
6 2.006M7 4.00+07 .00o•o7 8.00i+M
FIN ($)
95% CI - Fitted values
* yesfspct
1.00oi
1995 Participation
1998 Participation
FIN(S)
95% CI - Fitted values
* yesfspct
2001 Participation 2001 Participation
4.00oi0;o 0 2.000+07 4.000+07 6.00o+07
FIN ($) 8.00+07 1.006c+0
95% Cl - Fitted values
* yesfspct
The first column is linear models. The second column is quadratic models.
o6+0;
6 1.oo0•8 202.OOi+ 100W 6
FIN($)
95% Cl - Fitted values
yesfspct
· · ·
5
2
95% CI - Fitted values
* yesfspct
2.6. CONCLUSION
order to properly account for the errors-in-variables problems. As detailed in Table 2.8,
we find that conditional investment in foreign assets is substantially higher than
the unconditional levels measured in the previous sections. Specifically, in 2001
the conditional investment level is about $.18 or about 2.5 times greater than the
unconditional level measured under the averaging approach, and 4.5 times greater
than the level measured under the IV approach.24
The results in this section, particularly those from 2001, provide evidence that the
question of home bias is not so much an issue of levels, but rather one of participation.
In 2001, households which actually participated in foreign equity markets (i.e. those
which made portfolio choices that included positive amount of foreign equity) did so at
a rate of 18 cents per dollar. At this rate, those households' foreign equity holdings
are more consistent with predictions of standard portfolio choice models. With this
result, the home bias question becomes one of participation rather than (conditional)
allocation; this, we believe, is our central result.
2.6 Conclusion
This paper is primarily concerned with with foreign asset diversification. Classic
results detailing a lack of international diversification relied primarily on macro
data; this paper instead relies on micro level data that allows us to look more closely
at individual investment decisions. More importantly we consider a richer foreign
asset decision rule. This decision rule incorporates the notion that agents first decide
whether to invest in foreign assets thereby incurring any fixed costs associated with
that action and then contingent on that first decision agents can decide on the level
of foreign investment. Using this two-step decision rule and our individual micro
data we are able to show that the share of foreign assets is much closer to levels that
traditional portfolio theory would predict.
These results however are not consistently strong and moreover the result is only
dramatic in 2001. We interpret this as weak evidence that the home bias may be
diminishing and more importantly that it may be important to think about foreign
asset ownership decisions using more complicated decision rules rather just assuming
that all agents are equally able to participate in the foreign equity market.
Furthermore our analysis has omitted some major sources of potential interna-
tional diversification by not including bonds and mutual funds. The former, although
24 This estimation technique as described in the text has selection issues. Accordingly, one can
construct a method to estimate these coefficients taking these selection issues into account. One
possible approach is to utilize of a standard Heckman two-stage estimator. First estimate a probit
model. Then use the predicted values from this first-stage and average across observations (to correct
the errors in variables problem we described earlier in this paper) to estimate the second stage thus
producing estimates that take in account the selection issue. Note this approach requires the first
stage probit regression to have additional explanatory variables besides financial wealth to have
identification in the second stage regression.
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Table 2.8: Conditional Foreign Asset Investment in Levels
Implicate 11 1995 1998 2001
1 Intercept 46131.66** 474336.4* -1365957
(17642.96) (248379) (946914)
FIN 0.0073974*** 0.007799* 0.2055959***
(0.0009655) (0.0043092) (0.018327)
2 Intercept 47729.69*** -45177.56 -1174927
(13888.05) (36474.47) (905314)
FIN 0.0075897*** 0.0688061*** 0.1945395***
(0.000584) (0.0011388) (0.0219754)
3 Intercept 7547.298 397246.2 -941636.5
(26093.96) (252567.3) (759634.2)
FIN 0.0133184*** 0.0106562** 0.1776236***
(0.0009465) (0.0042075) (0.0192358)
4 Intercept 52408.13 266290 -766932.9*
(30819.98) (159599.6) (395787.9)
FIN 0.0076272*** 0.0190496*** 0.1572903***
(0.0018227) (0.0040166) (0.0090266)
5 Intercept 75953.85** -374409.9 -789254.1
(30627.21) (313647.5) (618151.2)
FIN 0.003985** 0.1034566*** 0.1638611***
(0.0018937) (0.0072245) (0.0149347)
Sample Average Intercept 45954.13 143657 -1007741
(23814.43) (202133.6) (725160)
FIN 0.00798354 0.0419535 0.17978208
(0.00124348) (0.00417932) 0.0166999
Results are levels regression by first eliminating all observations with no foreign assets and then
averaging across observations using fixed size groups of 20 observations. This result is from the first
set of implicates.
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Figure 2.4: Conditional Foreign Asset Ownership in Levels.
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in the data included, does little to change our results. The larger omission is that
of mutual funds. There is no doubt that this investment vehicle provides a substan-
tial degree of diversification to large numbers of investors, however, we could not
include it in our analysis due to data availability. Adequately including mutual funds
would require obtaining each household's fund holdings. We do believe though that
including mutual funds would only strengthen our results since a larger proportion of
individuals who own foreign equities also own mutual funds.
This paper attempts to estimate the propensity of households to invest their finan-
cial wealth in foreign equities. First, we note standard OLS estimates are problematic
due to significant errors-in-variables problems in the data and the standard approach
of using IV is not practical due to invalid instruments. We then construct an estimator
by averaging across observations to avoid errors-in-variables and, although these
estimates are much larger than the non-averaging approaches, our estimate foreign
equity investment levels is quite low. However since we have micro-level data, it is
clear than many households are not even participating in the foreign equity market
and this fact motivates a two-step investment decsion. We estimate that once house-
holds decide to invest in foreign equities, their choices are not nearly as low as implied
by aggregate data. The breaking up of the foreign equity investment decision is the
central result of this paper.
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Chapter 3
Using Identity in Principal-Agent
Models without Performance
Measures
Abstract
In this paper, we consider principal-agent models of organizations in which the
principal has no way to measure the output nor the effort level of agents. To model
this situation, we appeal to utility models that include identity, justified in part by
empirical results from peer-effects, and apply these extended utility functions to the
organizational forms we have assumed. We find that in the single agent case the
introduction of identity amounts to modifying the utility function and does not lead to
dramatic results. In the multiple agent case, we find that the addition of identity can
lead to more efficient outcomes than cases where identity is ignored. The addition
of identity, however, can also lead to counter-intuitive results due to the interactions
among agents and can also produce second-best outcomes that are worse than the
case without identity. Finally the addition of identity can help explain some empirical
results that may be difficult to explain with standard models.
3.1 Introduction
In the standard literature on organizations and incentives, principals and agents are
generally assumed to possess different information: we generally assume the agent
is better informed than the principal. Yet often times, even if the principal cannot
verify the information or the actions of the agent, he can still implicitly contract on
those actions since he can write contracts contingent on realized verifiable outcomes
as in the standard moral hazard model where effort is unobservable, but output is
verifiable. This paper differs in a substantial way from the standard literature by
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instead assuming the principal cannot observe anything regarding the agents actions
or the output associated with those actions and thus implies the standard solutions
for moral hazard models will no longer be implementable.
The obvious question, then, is if this assumption on observability is sensical.
Thus we put forward as the motivating example for the present work the case where
managers have little information or expertise in the area in which they are tasked to
manage. There are many examples of organizational structures in this vein and often
services within an organization are representative examples. Consider most of the
service operations of an enterprise including electrical, plumbing, and information
technology. Managers may know little to nothing about the relevant area yet are still
tasked with motivating and controlling these entities. Since they have little, if any,
knowledge of the actions of their subordinates, most types of performance evaluation
are essentially useless. Furthermore, since these groups are often service-orientated
their effect on observable outputs like production and profitability are difficult to
measure. There may, of course, be very coarse performance measures such as whether
the lights are on or not, but, as we will see, this can be used to provide essentially no
incentives.
If standard incentive contracts cannot be used in these situations, we must turn to
other alternatives in order to achieve better second-best outcomes. In fact, by allowing
a richer model of utility drawing on both evidence from peer effects and the theoretical
modeling of identity, we can construct examples where there are substantive results
even without performance measures and incentive contracts. In particular, we will see
how adding additional workers or by allowing the principal different actions can affect
the incentives of the workers without measuring their performance and still yield, in
some cases, efficiency-enhancing results. Of course this result is not universal and
the addition of these peer-effects could also lead to worse outcomes, a possibility that
is not ruled out in this framework.
The paper proceeds as follows. First, in the next section, we discuss the empirical
and theoretical underpinnings of this paper, namely the literature on peer effects and
identity. By reviewing the relevant literature, we hope to connect the peer-effects
and identity literature together. The section begins by providing empirical evidence
for the existence of peer effects amongst agents and then by introducing identity, we
will provide a mechanism for which peer effects can be introduced into organizations.
Section 3.3 develops the basic model we use throughout the paper. The first part of the
section discusses a basic two person, employer-employee relationship looking at how
identity can effect the relationship and how each player can affect that relationship.
The section then proceeds by adding additional agents and looking at the effect of
the identity and effort choices of the players as well as how the additional players
will affect the choices the principal must make. The section formalizes and solves
various formulations of the model as well as providing discussion of the results. Lastly,
section 3.4 concludes.
3.2. BACKGROUND AND RELATED LITERATURE
3.2 Background and Related Literature
Before proceeding to develop a model and discuss its implications, we must first
develop and establish the existence of organizations that can be ascribed with the as-
sumptions we are making. Furthermore, we must provide some empirical background
to justify the choice in modeling as well as the existence of the effects we rely on as
a mechanism that can induce higher effort. For the first task we will rely on mostly
anecdotal evidence and posit organizational structures that meet our needs. For the
second task we will rely on the economic literature.
3.2.1 Motivation
To begin with, by operating under the assumption that performance measures do not
exist, the relevant organizations must be fairly large and therefore the actual group
that we will model is a subset of the entire organization. A small organization simply
cannot have a lack of performance measures since the firm's profit provides a very
clear indication of performance and thus an easy way for owners to provide incentives
for all workers.1 Thus we will generally assume that the organization of interest is a
small group in a larger enterprise. This small group cannot produce anything tangible
or easily measurable though, since if, for example, the firm could pay workers in the
group a piece-rate, we are in the case of an easily measured performance and thus
the possibility of standard incentive contracts. Also, the supervisor or manager of
the group must have significant authority over the group, but have little ability or
knowledge to effectively monitor the group's effort or output. The manager, who we
will refer to as the principal, should have preferences that are aligned with the firm
and have the power to set wages and make hiring decisions for his group. Lastly the
group should have a positive effect on the firm's total output, but that effect should be
extremely difficult to independently measure. Again, if output is easily measurable,
the assumption regarding the lack of performance measures would not be believable.
Given the criteria we have laid out, do such organizations actually exist? We
believe that although this case is not the prototypical organization, there are many
examples of groups that meet most of these criteria. First, consider typical service-
type groups within larger organizations. These would include divisions that perform
maintenance of equipment or facilities, food service, as well as information technology
groups. These organizations are certainly necessary to the function of the overall
firm, yet in many cases the exact manner in which they affect firm profitability is
1What is not clear, however, is what the appropriate threshold is for a small enterprise. For example,
a firm with 10 employees is certainly small, yet it may be possible for that organization to exhibit
similar organizational problems that we discuss in the text. On the other hand, a firm with only 3
employees would prove very difficult to meet the criteria of the model. We generally will assume firms
are larger organizations employing more than 10 employees, yet nothing should be construed to rule
out applications to smaller firms if the other criteria are met.
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extremely difficult to measure.2 Furthermore, the supervisor of these groups is often
ill-equipped to understand exactly the nature of his subordinates' tasks or is too time
constrained to adequately monitor their actions; supervisors can often tell that the
workers are doing something, but cannot differentiate productive work from simply
acting as though one is working.
Moreover other examples where performance measures are nonexistent or ex-
tremely coarse can arise outside of traditional firms and can be evident in other
contracting relationships. Consider the case of a homeowner hiring a plumber, a
carpenter, an electrician, or other trade, the homeowner can often tell that the job
is complete, yet ascertaining the quality of the work or the effort the tradesman
expended on the work can be quite difficult. While these examples do not provide an
exhaustive list nor establish with proper empirical rigor the existence of organizations
we have described, we have shown that groups exist that at least exhibit many of the
aspects we require in the model and, having done so, we must proceed to provide some
underpinning for the choice of modeling.
3.2.2 Related literature
The models in this paper rely in large measure on the ability of agents to influence
other agents' behavior through non-contractual means and thus we require both theory
and evidence to support the existence of these means to influence agent behavior. We
will rely on two strands of literature to support these models. First, we will look at
the peer effects literature and second, we will look at the recent literature on identity.
In both cases, we will look at theoretical as well as empirical motivations that can
provide basic support for the formulation we will use in the present paper.
The peer effects and social interactions literature is mostly an empirical strand
of literature that tries to measure what effects peers have on specific outcomes.3
Although it is often difficult to measure peer effects due to self-selection and other
issues as discussed in Manski (2000), there are many papers that often focus on
education, housing, and crime. For example, Sacerdote (2001) uses random roommate
assignment at Dartmouth to identify peer effects and he finds that there are some
peer effects in GPA as well as in fraternity membership. Katz, Kling, and Liebman
(2001) finds that families who received randomized housing vouchers and moved out
of high-poverty public housing experienced improvements in multiple measures of
2For the IT example, certainly not all IT services would be applicable (like uptime of crucial services),
but consider, for one example, desktop support functions and efficiency in making purchasing decisions
which are both difficult to measure, yet will affect firm profitability.
3For an example of some recent theoretical work on peer-effects, see Battaglini, B6nabou, and Tirole
(2005). There is also some older theoretical literature in this vein. For example, Kandel and Lazear
(1992) looks at peer pressure in the context of partnerships. At first glance, partnerships would seem
to lead to free-rider problems, but the authors introduce peer pressure, shame, guilt, norms, and
monitoring to combat this effect. They find peer pressure can have an effect. Their paper differs from
ours by not including the psychological concept of identity and allowing that choice to be endogenous.
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well-being. Glaeser, Sacerdote, and Scheinkman (1996) uses a model that includes
social interactions to help explain the large variance in crime rates across cities which
does not seem to be well-explained by other socioeconomic factors.
The existence of social interactions and peer effects is, of course, not restricted
to those types of group interactions. For example, Hong, Kubik, and Stein (2004)
finds that "social" investors are more likely to invest in the stock market when their
peers also invest. There is also some experimental evidence of peer effects. Falk and
Ichino (2006) constructs an envelope filling experiment and identifies peer effects
since the authors find that when workers are "paired," by working independently
in the same room, their output is more similar than when they work in separate
rooms. Last, and most important for this paper, there are examples of peer effects
in organizations.4 Jones (1990) looks at the Hawthorne Studies and concludes that
workers' productivities were indeed interdependent. In other words, he finds evidence
of peer effects. For example, the author finds positive interdependencies between
certain pairs of workers. Another compelling example of peer-effects in organizations
comes from Ichino and Maggi (2000) which analyzes shirking behaviors in a large
Italian bank. Empirically there is a large difference in behavior between employees
in the branches in the south versus branches in the north; there is significantly more
shirking in southern branches. The paper proceeds and suggests several contributory
factors including the workers' backgrounds, sorting, and, most relevant to this paper,
group interactions to help explain this differential.5
While the peer effects literature we have discussed does provide empirical evidence
as to the existence of social interactions or peer effects, it often does not propose
mechanisms for the substantial empirical effects they measure. For example, Katz,
Kling, and Liebman (2001, page 612) suggests "positive social interactions ... can
arise from learning from peers, pure preference externalities ... , stigma effects ... ,
and physical externalities ... ", which is clearly a wide variety of mechanisms. To
tractably model the problem we have discussed in Section 3.2.1, we must settle on
a mechanism and a more formal model. One approach we could use to introduce
social interactions involves the altruism model of Rotemberg (1994). While that model
allows social interactions through signals and can produce outcomes approaching
the efficient outcome, its approach involves signals and, moreover, cannot cause
individuals to choose higher effort unless there is some interdependence in production.
While perhaps an extended version of Rotemberg (1994) may provide a starting
point, we will proceed down a different avenue since social interactions can also
arise in the recent literature on identities. This recent work does, in fact, describe a
4There are also several reviews and surveys of social interactions and peer effects, see Glaeser and
Scheinkman (1999), Brock and Durlauf (2000), Moffitt (2001), and the previously mentioned Manski
(2000).
5Mas and Moretti (2006) also finds the existence of peer effects for cashiers in a national supermarket
chain. The authors find that introducing high productivity workers causes other workers to increase
their own efforts.
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mechanism for altering preferences that includes group interactions. This literature
uses psychological insights to provide better utility formulations that allows for better
models of human behavior; these extended utility formulations can include "identity."
By providing a concept of identity, we have a method that allows an individual's utility
function to be affected by others in a tractable manner and thus provides much of the
theoretical groundwork for this paper.
The economic concept of identity is first developed in Akerlof and Kranton (2000).
The authors recognize that traditional utility based models miss important aspects of
human behavior and, with the help of psychological theory, seek to develop a more
complete model when human interactions are needed. In particular, the authors
develop the notion of "identity" and "category." The former concept refers to how an
individual looks at himself; it is his self-image. The latter term refers to how we
can represent an individual's identity by allowing individuals memberships in social
categories; these are the groups that an individual can identify with as well as the
groups that he can view others as members of. In the simplest case, the authors
propose supplementing utility functions to include identity, that is an individual's
utility is a functions of both actions and the individual's self-image. By including
identity, the utility function can capture the individual's view of himself as well as
how he perceives his actions will affect others' view of him. This last subject captures
the notion that categories have associated with them certain prescriptions or actions
and thus allows the utility function to capture the norms associated with various
social categories. In sum, the addition of identity allows richer interactions between
individuals as well as encompassing the individual's own self-image. The addition
of identity allows a more complete utility function for individuals that incorporates
extensive work in psychology.
While adding identity to utility functions in the manner of Akerlof and Kranton
(2000) could be done in standard organizational contexts, the same authors in Akerlof
and Kranton (2005) extend their model of identity and specialize it by applying it to
organizations. The authors argue that standard monetary incentive schemes often
have problems in real organizations and therefore well-functioning organizations
should not rely solely on them. The authors argue that workers should be assigned
to a job to which they can identify and the addition of these identities is crucial.
The authors go on to develop a simple formulation of a utility function that includes
identity by allowing workers to be one of two categories: an insider that identifies with
the firm and exerts high effort or an outsider that does not identify and consequently
exerts low effort. They introduce a simple utility function to characterize this situation
U(y,e; c) = logy - e + Ic - tle*(c)- el (3.1)
where y is the individual's income, e is his actual effort, c is his social category, Ic
is the identity utility associated with that category, e*(c) is the ideal or norm for
a member of category c, and thus the final term in the utility function penalizes a
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worker if he deviates from the social norm. By using this utility formulation which
captures the notion of identity, the authors look at the effects on standard monetary
incentive schemes and find that identity can be a complement or a substitute to
monetary incentives depending on how identity interacts with the agent's cost of
effort. They also mention that firms may be willing to invest to change a worker's
identity as well observing that identity becomes more important if effort is hard to
observe. Both of these observations we will address to some degree later in this paper.
In the next section, however, we will take the basic model of identity proposed in
equation (3.1) and begin to develop a tractable model of the interactions that exist
under the circumstances outlined in Section 3.2.1.
3.3 Basic Model
In this section, we will first discuss a basic principal agent type model that introduces
the concept of identity which allows us to develop some of the basic results as well
as contrasting our approach to the results of classic models. We first address the
one agent case and then proceed to multiple agents. In each case, we address the
resulting equilibriums of these models as well as addressing some possible extensions
incorporating slightly different assumptions.
3.3.1 One-agent case
We will start with the simplest model, that involving a single principal and a single
agent. As we have mentioned in both Section 3.1 and Section 3.2.1, the principal
is unable to measure the performance of the agent objectively nor subjectively and
therefore has little ability to use incentives to solve informational problems caused
by the non-aligned objectives of the principal and the agent.6 Although he has little
ability to provide incentives to the agent, the principal and agent are, as usual,
assumed to be in at least partial conflict. It is in the principal's interest for the worker
to exert a higher effort level than the worker would do so under fixed price contracts
since the agent cannot realize all the marginal gains of increased effort and hence
works at a socially inefficient level. To add concreteness to this setup consider the
following formulation.
Let the principal have a utility function Up(.) that is increasing in the agent's
effort level and decreasing in the agent's wage, thus
Up (e, w, () = f(e, ()- K(w) (3.2)
6Although we will carry this assumption throughout the paper, this could be weakened to allow
the principal some ability to verify the outcomes resulting from the agent's actions. In this case,
there would be interactions between monetary incentives and identity. Without specifying exactly how
identity affects the agent's effort choices, we cannot compute comparative statics for the identity model
versus a model without identity. We can say, however, the identity will matter.
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where we assume e is the agent's effort choice and w is the wage paid to the agent.7
The function f(.) is increasing and concave in e and K(.) is increasing and convex in w.
We will continue with the assumption we developed earlier where our organization is
a subunit of a larger organization and the output, f(.), for which the principal derives
utility includes the effort choice of the agent as well as a potentially random and
uncorrelated vector ( of other determinants of the firm's output. The agent is assumed
to be the standard risk-adverse type with utility increasing in w and decreasing in e
with utility function UA(') given by
UA(w, e) = u(w) - c(e)
where e and w are defined as before and u(.) is increasing and concave while c(*)
is increasing and convex. These assumptions, along with those restrictions on the
principal's utility function, assure there exists a socially optimal effort level e*. Notice
with a fixed wage contract and e E [e, -] the agent would always choose e = e.
As is evident in this simple framework, the inability of the principal to engage
in incentive contracts precludes the agent from ever exerting high effort-as long as
the principal has no signal regarding the agent's choice he cannot provide monetary
incentives to influence the agent's behavior and hence the agent will exert the low
effort level. To resolve this low-effort outcome, consider the case when we have hetero-
geneous agents each having an identity as we discussed in the previous section. In
that case, the agent's utility function can be represented differently and in particular
we modify the agent's utility function by including several other terms. To capture
the notion of identity we add an identity function which captures the added utility
the agent receives from choosing a particular category and a penalty function that
reduces the agent's utility if his effort choice-his behavior-differs from the effort
choice associated with his chosen category. Specifically, when agent i is of category
ci and the other individuals he interacts with have identity c-i, let Ici(ci) be the
identity function, or the added utility the agent receives when his identity is similar
to or different from other individuals. Second, let yJ(e*(ci),ei) be the penalty function
where e*(ci) is the effort associated with i's identity and ei is agent i's actual effort
choice. The penalty function should be increasing in the distance between the proper
action and the actual action and hence penalizes the agent when he performs an
action that is not associated with his identity. Thus agent i's utility function is
Ui(w, e i, c i, c-i) = u(w)- c(ei)+ Ici(c _-i) - (e*(ci), ei). (3.3)
When the agent has an identity in this manner, his effort choice can be higher than
the choice made by an agent with no identity. If an agent is of a category whose
7 For now we shall assume the wage is constant, we will come back to this point later.
8Assuming that the effort choice is restricted to some range captures the assumption that principal
would notice if the agent is doing nothing; e is the lowest effort choice that the principal will not realize
the agent is shirking.
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behavioral norm e* (c i) exceeds e, then that agent's effort choice will generally exceed
e given, of course, the penalty is severe enough to overcome the convexity of the effort
cost. The resulting effort choice then gives a strict improvement to the principal's
welfare as the wage is fixed. Thus, in this case, the addition of identity benefits the
principal.
Unfortunately, one drawback to the method we have just described arrives when
the agent has an identity that is detrimental to the principal. Suppose the agent's
identity has associated with it an optimal effort choice of e, that is the agent is
penalized if he works harder than e, in other words, his category is that of a bad
worker.9 Clearly this is not beneficial to the principal and, in fact, leads to the same
outcome that would occur if the agent had no identity at all. Furthermore, and even
worse for the principal, identities of this sort would lead to less optimal outcomes
even if signals existed as to the agent's effort choice as per standard moral hazard
models and would therefore require stronger monetary incentives from the principal
to induce higher effort choices.
The preceding result shows that identity in and of itself is not strictly utility
enhancing for the principal and indeed it could leave him strictly worse off in the case
of observable outputs. Thus in order to be useful to the principal, he must screen
potential agents to ascertain their identity before entering into a contract. If the
principal can successfully identify those agent's with a "good" identity, he can increase
his utility from screening workers based on their identity and only hire good workers.
This, of course, assumes that identity is something intrinsic to the agent and not part
of the agent's choice set, in fact, we will assume that identity is in the choice set in
section 3.3.2. Alternatively, if we assume that identity is not a choice variable, but
instead if there existed ways in which to modify a worker's identity and the principal
could utilize those methods, the principal would be willing to pay for this enhancement
as it can be utility increasing for the principal. Thus in this very simple framework,
the addition of agents who have an identity component to their utility functions can
lead to better second-best outcomes.l 0 On the other hand, adding identity with a
single agent is outcome equivalent to modifying the agent's utility function and hence
provides little theoretical interest. Moreover, if output is neither measurable nor
observable, this leads to a question of the functioning of screening potential workers
based on their identities. If the principal cannot monitor the agent, how could he
ascertain the agent's identity? The answer, of course, stems from the definition of
identity. Identity is not simply the agent's type in the sense that it measures the
agent's efficiency, cost of effort, or ability, as typical in hidden information models,
rather it is something less tangible, more like the agent's enthusiasm for the job,
demeanor, or passion. These traits are probably difficult to measure, but may not be
9Notice this case could also arise if the norm exceeds e since insufficient penalty functions could
still lead to utility maximization at e.
10 0f course if one really believes that identity is a key component of utility functions, then one should
not compare outcomes with identity to those without as the latter are therefore incorrectly modeled.
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unobservable as in the case of output in the framework of this paper.11
Although the addition of identity in principal-agent type models leads to some
results in the single-agent case, it becomes substantially more interesting when we
add additional agents. The addition of additional agents allows interactions among
agents and hence allows agents to influence other agents' behaviors. Although with
one agent, that agent's identity can influence behavior through his utility function,
from an organizational standpoint identity is just another component of the utility
function. With multiple agents, however, identity can play a larger role since agents'
choices can lead to externalities among the other agents. These peer effects can cause
different choices than if we ignore agents' identities.
3.3.2 Multiple agents
To proceed formally, we shall again assume that the principal has the utility function
from equation (3.2) and still cannot measure the agent's effort nor has any indication
of the agent's output. Thus we are still in the situation where conventional incentive
contracts based on performance measures fail. Now suppose that agents have utility
functions that incorporate identity; that is, all agents will have higher utility if
they perform the "proper" action associated with their respective identities as in
equation (3.3). First, consider if agents' identities are fixed throughout the game, then
there is little change from the one agent model-principals for whom higher output
is of marginally higher value will spend more on screening to hire agents that have
identities associated with higher effort if screening is possible.12 If, on the other hand,
agents' identities can change when they interact with their coworkers we can have
much more interesting dynamics since interactions between agents' identity choices
can lead to different effort choices. 13
To continue, we shall assume that agents identities are not fixed and indeed for now
will assume that an agent chooses his identity as part of his individual optimization
program. Some words need to be said regarding this choice of modeling. Allowing
agents a choice of identity presents a certain view of identity that differentiates it
from the standard notion of "types" in hidden information models, in this view identity
is not an unchangeable endowed characteristic of an agent, rather it is a choice that
"This naturally leads to the possibility of implementing subjective performance evaluations using
identity. In this paper, we hold to the assumption that performance measures are not possible, but
allowing identity screening may allow for implementing incentives using subjective evaluations on
identity.
12Notice that our utility formulation will not lead to the agent choosing a different effort when there
are multiple agents compared to when there is only one agent unless the penalty function is changed.
If the penalty function is fixed (the identity function is fixed since each agent's category is fixed) and
the wage is constant, additional agents will not affect existing agents' effort choices.
13Looking at Nash equilibria in choosing social categories and thus categories being chosen en-
dogenously is developed in Shayo (2005). For another example with an application in voting and
redistribution, see Lindqvist and Ostling (2006).
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can be optimized. It is not clear this is always the right choice. For example, if we
consider identity to be something like race or gender, then there is clearly not a choice
involved. For this model we do not view identity in this manner and instead consider
it groups to which agents may decide to identify with.14 For example, whether a
worker identifies with the goals of the company or if an employee is a team player and
identifies with his coworkers. These formulations of identity are changeable and thus
can conceivably be part of an agent's choice set.15 16
Now assuming that agents can choose both their identity and their effort choice
simultaneously, we can analyze the outcomes of the resulting game. To simplify, we
will begin with two agents which we shall identify as agent A and agent B. Both will
have the same utility function as in equation (3.3), but allowing the functional forms
u(-) and c(.) to be agent-dependent. Therefore each agent solves
max Ui(w,ei,ci,c-i)
ei,ci
for his optimal effort choice ei and category c^i holding the other agent's choices fixed.
Clearly with the assumptions we have made, the joint solution of these optimization
problems is the Nash equilibrium of the game and gives the resulting identity and
effort choices of the agents.
The important aspect of this formulation and the resulting equilibrium is the
fact the adding or subtracting agents can affect a given agent's effort choice even
if his wage or utility function remains unchanged; interactions between agents are
important. This has another effect, of course, as the principal must consider that
the hiring or firing of agents will affect the effort choices of existing agents and thus
hiring decisions are not the simple optimization problem of marginal revenue and
marginal cost that is normally considered.
To illustrate this we shall consider a slightly simplified game where agents can
choose from a limited number of categories. In particular, we will assume that agents
can be one of two categories: G or B; for good workers and bad workers respectively.
These identities have associated with them actions and we will assume the action
associated with the category G is e*, the efficient choice of effort, and that e is
associated with category B thus justifying the notion of a good or bad worker. We will
further assume that e* > e so the efficient effort level exceeds the minimum effort.
At this stage, we must make additional functional form assumptions on the identity
function and the penalty function. We will assume the utility agents receive from
14 In Akerlof and Kranton (2000) both fixed and changeable categories are considered.
15Beyond making identity changeable, we are making another assumption that the agent actually
makes the choice rather then identity being imposed. For example, a worker could be indoctrinated
into believing in a certain mantra rather than optimally choosing to conform to that identity.
16Beyond considering the changeable nature of identity, we can extend the model of identity choice
and allow a richer heterogeneity amongst agents by introducing a type-dependent cost to choosing a
given identity. For example, a naturally lazy worker would have a higher cost of choosing an identity
that requires high effort.
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choosing a particular category is determined by the number of other individuals who
are also in that category and thus
Ici(C_i) = g(#{other individuals of category ci})
where g(.) is a convex function of ci, the ith agent's choice of identity. This identity
function formalizes the fact that agents derive utility when they work with like-
minded individuals. For the penalty function we shall assume a simple quadratic loss
function, so
y(ei,e , tci)=tci(e* -ei) 2
where ei is the ith individual's effort choice, e.i is the ideal effort for an agent of
category ci (this may not be the efficient choice of effort e*), and tc, is a category
dependent parameter determining the level of disutility stemming from not acting
as per the norm for that category. As usual, the penalty function gives disutility to
the agent proportional to how far he deviates from the norm of his social category.
Given our assumptions regarding the norms of the two identities, we can already
say something about the parameters of the penalty function and the effort choices
of the agents. Clearly if e* is the norm for good workers, then it must be the case
that the action eG chosen by workers of category G satisfies u(w) - c(eG) - W Gf
u(w) - c(e) - tG(e* - e)2 where VG tG(e* - eG)2 for all e X eG otherwise agents in
category G would choose a different effort. We will assume that tG is large enough to
imply eG > e, but since the cost of effort is increasing and convex, eG < e *.17 A similar
argument places no restriction on the parameter tB since e minimizes c(e) over the
agent's choice set.
We can illustrate the agents' choices just described graphically. Figure 3.1 on
page 99 represents the normal form of the game in which the agents participate.
By carefully choosing the size of the penalty parameter we have effectively turned
both agents decision into a strictly one-dimensional choice of identity. There are two
possible Nash equilibria: that of both agents choosing category B, the bad worker
identity, or of both choosing the good worker identity G, however the good worker
equilibrium is only possible if the benefit from working with like-minded workers is
large enough; specifically if I(1) > c(eG) - c(e)+ tG, that is the benefit from working
with similar coworkers exceeds the marginal cost of exerting more effort as well as the
penalty associated with the good worker deviating from the efficient output choice. 18
There are also several observations worth noting in this example before moving on to
the principal's problem. First, this game, as constructed, amounts to little more than
a coordination game since the agents derive additional utility from matching their
identity choices. Second, if the agents could coordinate on an outcome, they would
17Of course by making tG arbitrarily large we can make eG as close to e* as desired. The key point,
of course, is only that eG is preferred by the principal since eG > e.
18As we stated earlier, this penalty can be made arbitrarily small by value of the penalty parameter
tG-
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B
G B
A G -c(eG)+ I(1)- G, -c(eG)+I(1)-- G --c(eG)- WG, -c(e)
B -c(e), -c(eG)-•IG -c(e)+I(1), -c(e)+I(1)
Figure 3.1: Normal form of identity and effort choice game for two agents.
Agent A's choice of identity is on the rows while agent B's are on the columns. Each cell represents A's
payoff followed by B's. Let I G tG(e* - eG)2 be the penalty associated with the good worker deviating
from the efficient choice of effort. Also, the payoffs in the table are excluding the utility from the wage,
that is agents actually receive the payoffs in the table plus u(w).
choose the bad worker equilibrium as it is surplus maximizing.
Now that we have characterized the agents' choices and developed some results
in a simple two agent case, we will return to the principal and consider his choices.
Insofar as providing incentives to the agents, the principal is helpless; holding to
the assumptions we have made throughout the paper, the principal cannot measure
output nor effort and therefore offers fixed wage contracts. The principal, however,
has already made several decisions that affect the form of the organization namely
the choice of which agents to hire and how many agents to hire. 19 With respect to
which agents to hire, we have already discussed the role of pre-hiring screening of
employees, but now that task becomes more difficult since agents can choose their
identities endogenously and simultaneously making employee interactions extremely
important. Thus we will not consider the principal's choice as to which agents to hire,
but now, instead, we will consider the other choice the principal makes, that is, the
number of workers to hire.
To make a simplifying assumption, we will consider a very simple case for the
principal: whether to hire an additional worker or not. Theoretically the question
is quite simple for the principal as he will hire additional workers as long as the
increased profit from the worker exceeds the cost of hiring that worker or, in our case,
if the value of additional output exceeds the wage rate paid to the worker. There are,
however, significant differences between that simple view and the assumptions we
have made thus far. First, it is unclear before the worker is hired and, under the
assumptions we have made regarding observability of information, even after the
hiring how the principal can judge the effectiveness of the hire. More importantly,
there is a discontinuity with respect to the hiring of an additional worker since the
identity choice of the additional worker will affect both his own effort choice as well
as any previously hired workers' identity choices.
To formalize this situation and analyze its outcome, consider the following model.
We shall assume the principal is restricted to paying fixed wage contracts and, given
this restriction, the cost of hiring n workers is nw where w is the wage paid to each
19 For now we are assuming a static game which will disallow the principal from trying to modify a
workers identity during the game.
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worker. Furthermore we shall assume the principal's utility is
Up(e,(, n, w) = f(e,() - nw
where e is the vector of effort choices made by the agents the principal employs. There
are clearly several cases that can confront the principal depending on the identity
choice of existing workers and the number of workers. For the simplest case, we will
assume the principal is currently employing one worker and is considering hiring an
additional worker. We will assume that it is actually economically beneficial to hire
an additional worker so f'(e,() > w at e = eG, but it is inefficient at e. Even with this
assumption, though, the actual value of the worker depends not only on his effort,
but also his identity choice, as well as the identity choices of the existing workers.
Notice with the assumptions we have made regarding the worker's utility function
and choice set, the existing worker is necessarily choosing the bad worker identity
since c(e) < c(eG) and thus it is actually economically inefficient to be employing that
single worker.20 Now if the principal hires an additional worker and we assume I(1)
is large enough, the agents may reach the good worker Nash equilibrium implying it
is economically efficient to employ both workers even if it was not efficient to employ
the first one. This rather strange result stems from the discontinuity created by the
externalities between the agents which can lead to rather surprising results such as
this.
Although the results we have just seen are somewhat counterintuitive using stan-
dard theory, the addition of a richer utility framework allows these more interesting
results to arise. In particular, allowing interactions among agents gives rise to equi-
librium outcomes that significantly complicate the principal's task. As we saw in the
very simple model we have developed, adding additional agents can cause changes in
the effort choices of all the existing agents. In particular, the addition of one agent can
lead to many agents changing their effort choice. This result can even in some cases
justify hiring more agents than seemingly necessary since the additional agents may
be influencing the effort choices of each other. Given the central role that identities
can play in interactions among agents and the resulting effect on firm profitability,
the question naturally arises how the principal can take advantage of these identities
to increase his payoff.
As we have mentioned previously, one method the principal can use to increase
his payoff is to screen employees. We mentioned previously that screening employees
based on identity may not be impossible since some characteristics associated with
identity may be observable. Using the simplifying assumptions we have made so far
in our examples, this screening would, of course, be impossible since agents optimally
choose their identity and are homogeneous. Richer models, however, could introduce
heterogeneity among agents through the identity function, the penalty function, or by
2 0 0f course the principal does not realize that employing the worker is profit decreasing since he
cannot measure the output nor the effort of the agent.
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allowing agents to have an existing identity and by allowing identity changes only at
some cost. If an agent must bear a cost to switch identities, then there is some room
for screening agents as agents with better initial identities will be more valuable to
the principal since they would increase the likelihood that the agents would attain
the good worker equilibrium.
Since we allow identity to be a choice, another possible method to modify identity
comes from the principal expending effort in order to influence the agents' choices of
identity. These methods could lead to changes in both the identity function I(*) and
the penalty function ly(.) which, in many ways, amounts to rewarding good behavior
and punishing bad behavior. Just as in the case of screening it is not exactly clear
the correct method the principal should use to influence these functions. Identity
arises because the individual identifies with something so one method of changing
the benefit from belonging to an identity would come from creating an environment
conducive to that identity. Perhaps expending effort to cause agents to identify with
the objectives of the firm or ways in which good identity employees can better associate
together. In the simple model we developed earlier, there would be no place for these
methods, however, by generalizing I(.) to be conditional on ci, allows the principal to
potentially influence the identity choices of the agents and can make the good worker
equilibrium more likely and possibly surplus-maximizing. 21 Nonetheless a richer
formulation of these identity rewards can allow the principal more influence over the
game's outcome, but even though the principal need not influence the game using the
standard monetary incentive contracts, yet his actions still may lead to more efficient
outcomes.
There are several comments that can be made about the equilibrium outcomes
predicted by the model we have just developed. Importantly, in the two-player simul-
taneous move game, we have no method for determining which equilibrium outcome
would occur. In fact, if the players could collude, they would choose the bad worker
equilibrium. We believe this is partially an artificial result of the simplistic model of
identity: introducing heterogeneous identity functions and penalty functions as well
as allowing the principal to modify those functions can lead to different equilibriums
becoming more or less likely. Another problem can arise from multiplicity of equilibria
in general, multiplayer settings with more complex identity functions and identity
switching costs. Although, as we prove in the appendix, the simple one-shot game we
have developed in this section will have all players choosing the same identity, this is
not always the case with more general functions and equilibria could exist in which
some workers choose a good worker equilibrium and others choose the bad worker
equilibrium. This result is not problematic since it is conceivable that larger organiza-
tions would have a variety of different groups each having their own social norm and
identity. As we have introduced identity, it is not a method for determining optimal
compensation or organization, but rather another factor that must be included to
2 1Clearly in the game we have represented, the good worker equilibrium can never be a dominant
strategy equilibrium unless IB(c-i) < 0.
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more fully understand employee relationships and their effect on the firm. Further, by
adding some realistic extensions to the model, we can often provide some explanation
for some empirical results.
With respect to extending the model, we can also introduce another, possibly richer
and more realistic, addition to this framework that can be used to provide some
explanation for the Ichino and Maggi (2000) result. We shall assume that the identity
function is convex in the number of individuals choosing that identity and there is
some cost to changing identity that is also increasing in the number of individuals
choosing the identity. These assumptions amount to assuming that individuals receive
progressively more utility if their social category has more members and the cost from
switching away from that category is increasing if the category has many members.
These are not unrealistic assumptions. Certainly there may be positive scale in a
social category somewhat analogous to network effects. Furthermore, it would not
be surprising if trying to switch away from this category would be increasingly costly
when there are many members; trying to disassociate from a dominant group could
lead to the worker being completely ostracized. Under these assumptions, consider the
case of a northern worker moving into a southern branch. The existing equilibrium in
the south has workers choosing the low-effort category and hence a higher incidence
of shirking. Under the assumptions we have made in this paragraph, the northern
worker would have tremendous incentive to also choose the low-effort identity and
join the culture of the southern branch. In other words, the worker would have strong
incentives to blend in. In a more general setting, these assumptions will prevent
small numbers of individuals from changing the culture (the realized equilibrium) of
a firm, but also suggest one method that could change the culture: simultaneously
import large numbers of individuals that have a different identity.
We can illustrate this situation by slightly modifying the framework we have
introduced earlier. First, we will introduce another penalty for the agents. Let y be
the cost borne by an agent when he switches identities. As we described in the last
paragraph, this parameter is generally a function that is increasing in the number
of agents choosing a different identity from the agent; for simplicity, we will assume
it is a constant. The penalty is meant to capture the fact that it is costly for an
agent to switch identities. To switch identities he must first begin to view himself
differently, as a member of a different category, and, second, others must perceive him
as a member of a new category. This addition leads to the slightly modified utility
function
Ui(w,ei, ci, c-i) = u(w) - c(ei) + Ici(ci) - Vy(e*(ci), ei) -y
when the agent chooses a category different from what he previously chose. Given the
cost to switch identities, it is natural to modify the timing of the game we developed
earlier. This modification also fits in well with the empirical example of introducing
additional workers into an organization with a well-defined equilibrium. We will
consider that the organization is already in an equilibrium and the firm is bringing
in a new worker. The new worker already has an identity and once he is hired, he
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must decide whether to retain his existing identity or choose to switch identities. The
existing workers do not have a choice of identity at this stage; they have already made
their choice and we will assume the culture of the firm is fixed temporarily at least.22
Now consider the case of a southern worker moving north. In that case, the realized
equilibrium of the northern branch is the n workers choosing the good identity.23 The
new worker, however, is from the south and choosing the bad worker identity. Now the
new worker has a choice between the two: he can continue choosing the bad worker
category and receive utility u(w) - c(e) or switch to the good worker category and
receive u(w) - c(eG)+ I(n) - V/G - y. Again, the agent will find switching identities is
beneficial only if the added utility from the identity function is large enough. In other
words, the agent will choose to identify with the other employees if the utility he gains
from that identification is large enough; if the benefits of camaraderie, friendship,
appreciation, self-image, and other non-monetary factors exceed the higher effort cost
and cost of choosing a new category, he will change categories.
The preceding formalization also illustrates that different results could be obtained
if multiple workers were hired simultaneously. For example, consider hiring m
workers from the south and suppose those workers were choosing the bad worker
category. Now, it could be the case that the equilibrium for these new workers is
to continue choosing the bad worker category and thus their utility function would
include I(m - 1). This addition makes it less likely the new workers would switch
to the good worker identity since in order to do so the identity function must be
convex enough to compensate a worker for the switch as well as the utility the worker
is already receiving from I(m - 1). Moreover, whenever existing workers have an
opportunity to choose their identity, they may also be tempted by the new workers'
equilibrium and it may be beneficial for the existing worker to switch categories to
the bad worker identity. This illustrates one implication of this model that we alluded
earlier. A firm can change its culture, the identity choices of its workers, by importing
large numbers of workers with a different identity, but this also illustrates the danger
and potential fragility of the good worker equilibrium: a firm in that equilibrium
could incrementally acclimate new workers, but massive hiring could lead to the bad
equilibrium occurring.
Lastly, throughout this subsection, we have assumed identity is a choice variable
like effort and thus it is also worth coming back to the case when identity is not a
choice variable, that is identity is like individual tastes or ability, an intrinsic element
22This assumption is meant to capture the dynamic nature of these identity choices. Since identity is
inherently a social concept, the addition of one worker should not have a large effect on the existing
social interactions in the firm. This is somewhat at odds with the static outcomes we considered earlier.
We do not view these as contradictory, but rather complementary. The static game is more appropriate
for small numbers of players newly initiated without a significant history together or a way to illustrate
the possible long-term outcomes from a large number of workers. The more dynamic game in this
paragraph is the short-run result when there are additions or subtractions to existing groups that have
already had a chance to form identities and relationships.
23We will assume that all workers in the north are choosing the good worker category.
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of an agent that cannot be changed.24 In this case identity can still play a role, albeit a
much smaller role. In this case, as we mentioned earlier, the vector of identities leads
to a vector of optimal effort choices of the agents independent of the other agents'
choices since the identity benefit function I(.) is fixed with respect to effort. However,
since identity is a part of all the agents' utility functions, it will influence a different
decision the agents make: namely, whether to work or not. Since the identity benefit
directly enters the agents' utility functions, it will change the level of utility and hence
whether that level exceeds each agent's reservation utility. In this manner, firing
one agent could actually lead to many agents' utilities falling below the reservation
threshold even with no changes in the compensation structure. Again this illustrates
the potentially large effect that the identity interactions can have among agents and
how it further complicates the principal's optimization problems.
3.4 Conclusion
As we have seen in the preceding sections, we can use the foundation laid by peer
effects and identity to construct a simple way to model organizations that at first
glance seem to have little ability to provide incentives. We saw that some basic
intuitions fail in this world, but the model also supports some common sense wisdom.
We find that even though monetary incentives are not available, the firm does have
other methods to induce effort and interactions among agents play an extremely
important role.
To begin with we developed a basic model of a principal and an agent and allowed
richer utility formulations that could include identity. In this simplest formulation,
we saw the outcomes change little and could be obtained with pre-hiring screening
or effective identity-changing behavior by the principal. On the other hand, allowing
more agents gives the model richer results and implications. In particular, the addition
of multiple agents complicates hiring decisions since it introduces a discontinuity of
the marginal revenue of additional workers. This discontinuity can lead to structures
that are efficiency enhancing or not and indeed leads to a variety of possible outcomes.
We also considered various ways of slightly perturbing the formulation by allowing
screening, allowing the principal to affect the agents' identity choices, and having fixed
identities and looked at the results of these perturbations on equilibrium outcomes.
We also proposed a way to use this formulation to provide a possible explanation for
one of the peer effects examples.
Throughout this paper we have tried to use a new utility formulation to capture
interactions and outcomes in organizational forms where it is very difficult to provide
standard monetary incentives or subjective performance evaluations. Although the
more complete utility formulations produce outcomes that vary substantially and are
24This would also be similar to introducing a more dynamic game where we disallow identity changes
in certain periods, so, in a one-shot game, identity was fixed.
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not always efficiency enhancing, there does seem to be evidence that organizational
models should include social interactions since there seems to be compelling empirical
and theoretical evidence showing its existence. Although we have used identity as
a method to provide some structure to organizations with a rather unconventional
and admittedly contrived structure, these identity formulations could also be used
in more standard organizational forms. Indeed we have illustrated that this small
addition to utility functions can give large dividends and lead to outcomes that differ
substantially from outcomes given by standard utility formulations.
Appendix
Proposition 1. When multiple agents play the normal form game illustrated on
page 99 and choose between two categories, the resulting equilibrium will have all
agents choosing the same identity.
Proof Suppose not and n agents choose the good worker identity while m agents
choose the bad worker identity. To prevent good workers from deviating, it must
be that I(n - 1) - c(eG) - Y/G - I(m) - c(e) or I(n - 1) - I(m) _ c(eG) - c(e) + IG. Let
c(eG) - c(e)+ VG = 17. Notice 7 > 0 and since I(.) is increasing and convex, this implies
n - 1 > m. Now for one of the m bad workers to not unilaterally deviate requires
I(m - 1) - c(e) > I(n) - c(eG) - V'G or I(m - 1) - I(n) > -(c(eG) - c(e) + VG) = -77. Hence
both I(n - 1) - I(m) _ 17 and I(n) - I(m - 1) < q. Since I(-) is increasing, I(n - 1) < I(n)
so I(n - 1) - I(m - 1) < I(n) - I(m - 1) and thus I(n - 1) - I(m - 1) < I(n) - I(m - 1) < 7 <7
I(n - 1) - I(m) implying that I(n - 1)- I(m - 1) < I(n - 1)- I(m) or I(m - 1) > I(m) and
thus violating the assumption that I(.) is increasing. Hence all agents must choose
the same identity in equilibrium. O
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